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INTRODUCTION 
Two known fraudsters start a company in China and decide to glean 
hundreds of millions of dollars from U.S. investors.  So the fraudsters form 
an entity structure that escapes both Chinese and U.S. regulation, they have 
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local bank branches lie about deposit and loan balances, and they move 
most of their expenses to an off-balance-sheet entity.  With debts and 
expenses concealed, they report industry-leading margins, so Goldman 
Sachs and Morgan Stanley underwrite their U.S. initial public offering 
(IPO).  They achieve a peak market capitalization of $2.4 billion dollars.  
They hire a leading audit firm to attest that their fraudulent financial 
statements fairly represent the company, but the audits are so obviously bad 
that a cottage industry of short-sellers—researchers who look for obvious 
frauds, buy short positions in them, and then expose the frauds on the 
Internet—notices the implausibility of the fraudsters’ financial reports.  
The stock price crashes, prompting the auditors to review matters a little 
more closely.  The auditors suddenly find fraud and publicly resign, 
renouncing their prior audits.  Unsurprisingly, investors sue the auditors in 
addition to the company.  Yet the suit cannot survive a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim. 
This was the case of In re Longtop Financial Technologies Ltd. 
Securities Litigation (Longtop).1  It is one example in a long series of 
audacious Chinese securities frauds.  This Note examines circumstances 
that have left U.S. capital markets especially vulnerable to frauds by U.S.-
listed Chinese firms.  As described in Part I, the Chinese market places less 
emphasis on the quality of financial reporting than the U.S. market and 
accordingly has less rigorous enforcement of reporting requirements.  
Efforts at cross-border regulation by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) have failed to provide effective protection for investors 
in Chinese firms listed on U.S. exchanges.  Where local and SEC 
enforcement efforts cannot protect investors, the only remaining protection 
for investors is the work of the independent auditor.  U.S. investors in the 
Chinese market rely on audits performed by U.S.-branded audit firms. 
Part II analyzes the dismissal of claims against Deloitte in the Longtop 
scandal, even though the plaintiffs possessed nearly perfect facts for a fraud 
action.  Part III discusses the two major legal obstacles that frustrated the 
plaintiffs’ attempt to state a claim against Deloitte.  The first was that the 
elevated scienter pleading requirement of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)2 is an especially difficult hurdle for a 
securities fraud action against a foreign auditor of a foreign company.  
Direct evidence of scienter is unlikely to be available when both the auditor 
and the audited company are in China.  The second legal obstacle was that 
 
 1.  910 F. Supp. 2d 561, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 2.  The PSLRA requires plaintiffs to plead with particularity facts giving rise to a “strong 
inference” of scienter.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2012). 
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the auditors’ global network structure successfully isolates liabilities into 
individual member firms.  Though the plaintiffs requested voluntary 
dismissal of their claims against Deloitte’s international umbrella entity, 
existing law would have likely insulated it from any liability even if the 
claim had proceeded. 
The Longtop example is another chapter of an old story.  One hundred 
years ago, auditors certified the correctness of financial statements, but 
“certification” changed to “opinion” when they were exposed to potential 
liability to third parties relying on those statements.  Nonetheless, after the 
Crash of 1929, certified public accountants (CPAs) were able to obtain an 
exclusive franchise over auditing in place of a proposed public agency 
takeover.  Ever since, a long series of accounting scandals, from McKesson 
& Robbins to Enron, has slowly increased auditors’ acceptance of a 
professional responsibility to detect fraud.  Each scandal demonstrated 
inadequacy in the auditing function and in its regulation.  Part IV places 
financial statement frauds based in China in this historical context. 
Canadian capital markets too have been victimized by China-based 
securities frauds.  Responding to both American post-Enron reform efforts 
and Supreme Court of Canada decisions restricting common law auditor 
liability, Ontario adopted a relatively successful statutory civil liability 
scheme.  Part V examines the development of auditor liability in Canada.  
The effectiveness of the Canadian approach of exposing auditors to private 
liability is compared to that of the U.S. approach of cross-border 
regulation.  In the case of Sino-Forest, Canadian investors received a record 
settlement, while in the case of Longtop, U.S. investors received nothing 
from the auditor. 
Like prior scandals, China-based frauds should prompt reforms of the 
U.S. auditing profession to better protect the U.S. investor.  Part VI 
suggests four reforms that would mitigate the issues that thwarted the fraud 
action brought by Longtop’s investors.  First, the PSLRA’s heightened 
scienter-pleading requirement should be reformed.  The PSLRA was 
intended to prevent domestic nuisance suits, not to shield foreign actors 
defrauding U.S. investors.  Second, the role of scienter in the substantive 
standard of auditor liability to purchasers in the secondary market should 
be reconsidered.  Third, the U.S. affiliate of a global accounting network 
should bear liability for co-affiliate’s audits of foreign companies listed on 
U.S. exchanges.  Auditors should not be able to extend their brands to 
audits of foreign companies listing in the United States without bearing any 
liability for the assurance reasonably given to investors by those brands.  
Fourth, U.S. auditors should face an increased scope of liability when they 
or their affiliates attest to the financial statements of U.S.-listed companies 
BARBER MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 6/26/2014  9:51 PM 
352 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 24:349 
that are based in markets that do not fully cooperate with U.S. regulators. 
I. FRAUD AND CHINA 
The quality of financial reporting in the Chinese market is relatively 
low, and financial statement fraud is pervasive.  There is also a major 
“regulatory hole” with respect to “variable interest entities” (VIEs), which 
evade U.S. regulators by being in China and avoid Chinese regulators by 
listing in the United States through a Cayman Islands-based entity.3  U.S. 
investors in Chinese companies must therefore rely heavily on audits by 
U.S.-branded auditors.  This reliance is big business for the auditors: the 
“Big Four” audit firms charged Chinese firms listed in the United States 
over $153 million in audit fees in 2010.4 
The main financing sources of China’s listed companies have been 
controlling shareholders and banks.5  These entities possess and act on 
private information and, in the case of banks, take security interests in 
physical assets.6  Accordingly, the Chinese stock market has less rigorous 
enforcement of financial reporting requirements than is typical of 
developed countries.7  As a result, a high proportion of firms listed in 
Chinese stock markets receive modified audit opinions: between 1992 and 
2006, 11% of China-listed firms received modified opinions, compared to 
only 2% of companies listed in other East Asian markets in the same 
period.8  Auditors issue modified opinions when they believe the financial 
statements do not fairly present a firm’s financial position.9  A modified 
opinion suggests that the quality of the financial statements is “very 
poor.”10  However, in light of the traditional sources of financing for 
Chinese companies, receiving a modified opinion has had little effect on 
financing or investment available to these firms.11  Thus the Chinese stock 
 
 3.  See infra notes 22–29 and accompanying text. 
 4.  Paul Gillis, Who Audits China?, CHINA ACCT. BLOG (Nov. 22, 2011, 10:56 PM), http://www. 
chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/who-audits-china.html.  The Big Four are PwC, Deloitte, EY 
(formerly Ernst & Young), and KPMG. 
 5.  Zhiwei Lin et al., Do Modified Audit Opinions Have Economic Consequences? Empirical 
Evidence Based on Financial Constraints, 4 CHINA J. ACCT. RES. 135, 151 (2011). 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. at 137. 
 8.  Id. at 135.  Modified audit opinions are those with explanatory paragraphs or opinions that are 
qualified, disclaimed, or adverse. 
 9.  Id. at 152. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. at 136; but see Robert Czernkowski et al., The Value of Audit Qualifications in China, 25 
MANAGERIAL AUDITING J. 404, 422 (2010) (finding a significant reduction in stock prices for 
companies receiving modified audit opinions accompanied by explanatory notes). 
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market places—or at least historically has placed—less emphasis on the 
quality of financial reporting, so the credibility of its financial reporting is 
lower—and audit opinions about that reporting are less valued—than it 
would be in the U.S. market.12 
It is likely that these conditions continue when Chinese firms enter the 
U.S. market by listing on a U.S. stock exchange.  The “bonding 
hypothesis” posits that becoming subject to U.S. regulation and 
enforcement, as well as to intermediaries such as debt raters, commits the 
cross-listing firm to fuller disclosure and respect for minority investors.13  
Yet this hypothesis is doubtful when applied to China: one recent study has 
found that “there is no evidence that cross-listing firms are superior to 
domestic Chinese firms in financial reporting quality.”14 
Moreover, within China, fraud is pervasive.15  Recent financial 
statement frauds by Chinese firms listing in the United States have been 
particularly audacious.16  In the two year period from 2011 to 2013, for 
example, Longtop Financial Technologies, China MediaExpress, China 
Sky One Medical, China Energy Savings Technology, ShengdaTech, China 
Values Technology, Sino-Forest Corporation (listed in Toronto), and China 
Integrated Energy each lost over 95% of its respective market capitalization 
following discovery of major financial statement frauds.17  In 2010, almost 
half of all securities class actions filed against foreign issuers were brought 
against China-based companies listed on U.S. exchanges.18  In the same 
period, there were at least forty-five New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or 
NASDAQ delistings of Chinese companies, with another twenty-four 
 
 12.  This is not to say that audit opinions are not valued at all by Chinese capital markets.  See Z. 
Jun Lin et al., Market Implications of the Audit Quality and Auditor Switches: Evidence from China, 20 
J. INT’L FIN. MGMT. & ACCT. 35 (2009) (presenting evidence that the Chinese stock market responds 
positively to firms that switch to a larger auditor). 
 13.  John C. Coffee, Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market 
Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1780–81 (2002). 
 14.  Li Li Eng & Ying Chou Lin, Accounting Quality, Earnings Management and Cross-Listings: 
Evidence from China, REV. PAC. BASIN FIN. MARKETS & POL’YS, June 2012, at 1, 18. 
 15.  See Stanley Lubman, Fraud, Culture and the Law: Can China Change?, WALL ST. J. CHINA 
REAL TIME (Aug. 24, 2012, 12:09 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/08/24/fraud-culture-
and-the-law-can-china-change/ (discussing, in the context of “a social and economic environment in 
which legal rules are as often as not disregarded,” various recent frauds in China involving, among 
other things, fake medicine, fake Apple stores, and even fake military bases and fake prisons disguising 
the production of counterfeit cigarettes). 
 16.  Floyd Norris, The Audacity of Chinese Frauds, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2011, http://www. 
nytimes.com/2011/05/27/business/27norris.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 17.  YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com (get quotes search) (last visited Jan. 7, 2013). 
 18.  David Bario, Two (More) U.S. Listed Chinese Companies Are Hit with Securities Class 
Actions, AM. LAW., Feb. 9, 2011, available at LEXIS ADVANCE. 
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facing imminent delisting.19 
Though fraud is pervasive in China, Chinese regulations can 
nonetheless be onerous.  For example, private Chinese companies need 
state permission to list overseas, and this permission was, until recently, 
difficult to acquire.20  In addition, foreign investment is restricted in certain 
sectors, such as telecommunications and the Internet.21  Chinese firms 
wishing to list in the United States can avoid these restrictions and escape 
Chinese regulation of financial reporting through the use of a VIE 
structure.  In such a structure, a domestic entity, owned by a Chinese 
national, owns the substantive business.22  Contractual agreements, rather 
than equity, transfer most of the economic interest in that entity to another 
Chinese entity that is a subsidiary owned by a foreign company, usually a 
Cayman Islands corporation.23  The contractual agreements typically 
include a loan agreement, by which the foreign company capitalizes the 
domestic company; an equity pledge agreement that provides collateral 
under the loan agreement; a call option agreement allowing the foreign 
company to purchase the domestic company at any time; a power of 
attorney agreement giving all of the domestic company’s shareholder rights 
 
 19.  Chinese Delistings on U.S. Exchanges, TRADING CHINA (Sept. 30, 2012), http://china.fixyou. 
co.uk/2012/09/chinese-delistings-on-us-exchanges.html. 
 20.  See Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui Gonggao [1999] 83 Hao: Zhong Guo 
Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui Guanyu Qiye Shenqing Jingwai Shangshi Youguan Wenti De 
Tongzhi (中国证券监督管理委员会公告 1999 83号：中国证券监督管理委员会关于企业申请境外
上市有关问题的通知) [China Securities Regulatory Commission Announcement [1999] No. 83: 
Notice on Relevant Issues Concerning Enterprise Applications for Overseas Listing] (promulgated by 
the China Sec. Reg. Comm’n., July 14, 1999, effective July 14, 1999), available at http://www.csrc. 
gov.cn/pub/newsite/xxfw/fgwj/bmgz/200803/t20080305_77921.htm.  These rules have been abolished 
and replaced by Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui Gonggao [2012] 45 Hao: Guanyu 
Gufen Youxian Gongsi Jingwai Faxing Gupiao He Shangshi Shenbao Wenjian Ji Shenhe Chengxu De 
Jianguan Zhiying (中国证券监督管理委员会公告 2012 45号: 关于股份有限公司境外发行股票和上
市申报文件及审核程序的监管指引) [China Securities Regulatory Commission Announcement 
[2012] No. 45: Guidelines for Supervising the Application Documents and Examination Procedures for 
the Overseas Stock Issuance and Listing of Joint Stock Companies] (promulgated by the China Sec. 
Reg. Comm’n., Dec. 20, 2012, effective Jan. 1, 2013), available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/ 
laws/overRule/Announcement/201301/t20130106_220125. 
 21.  Waishang Touzi Dianxin Qiye Guanli Guiding (外商投资电信企业管理规定) [Provisions on 
Administration of Foreign-Invested Telecommunications Enterprises] (promulgated by St. Council 
Decree No. 333, Dec. 11, 2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002, as amended Sept. 10, 2008, by St. Council 
Decree No. 534 (2008)), available at http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2008/content_1102750.htm.  
In the law, the term “valued added services” includes many Internet services.  See Lothar Determann, 
Internet Business Law in China for US Companies, BAKER & MCKENZIE, http://www.bakermckenzie. 
com/RRGoverningEBusinessInChinaOct09/ (last visited May 7, 2014). 
 22.  Paul Gillis, Accounting Matters: Variable Interest Entities in China, GUEST SERIES (Forensic 
Asia Ltd., H.K., China), Sept. 18, 2012, at 4–5, available at http://www.chinaaccountingblog.com/vie_ 
2012septaccountingmatte.pdf. 
 23.  Id. 
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to the foreign company; and a technical service agreement, through which 
the foreign company extracts the profits of the domestic company.24 
These agreements allow the domestic company to be consolidated into 
the financial statements of the Cayman Islands holding corporation, which 
lists on U.S. exchanges.25  In 2010, 47% of NYSE and 65% of NASDAQ 
listings of Chinese firms used VIEs.26  Since foreign investment in the 
Internet sector is restricted in China, eight of the largest ten VIE listings on 
U.S. exchanges are Internet companies.27  By far the largest U.S.-listed 
Chinese VIE is Baidu—China’s Google—with a market capitalization of 
over $40 billion dollars.28  These Cayman Islands entities are considered 
foreign corporations not subject to Chinese regulation.29  As U.S.-listed 
entities, they are subject to U.S. financial reporting regulations, but because 
the substantive business activities are in China, any audit must be 
conducted there, requiring Chinese cooperation. 
This cooperation is lacking for any Chinese firm listed in the United 
States, including VIEs.  China views U.S. regulatory oversight of Chinese 
auditors as a violation of Chinese sovereignty.30  China also heavily 
regulates the transfer of documents out of China.  China’s “state secrets” 
laws may cover audit work papers and may require pre-approval from 
Chinese regulatory authorities before any disclosure to foreign regulators. 31 
 
 24.  Id. at 5–6. 
 25.  ACCOUNTING STANDARDS CODIFICATION § 810-10 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2009). 
 26.  Paul Gillis, Statistics on VIE Usage, CHINA ACCT. BLOG (Apr. 11, 2011, 7:20 PM), http:// 
www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/statistics-on-vie-usage.html. 
 27.  Gillis, supra note 22, at 1. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. at 7. 
 30.  Patrick Chovanec, The Clash of the Balance Sheets, FOREIGN POL’Y, Dec. 10, 2012, http:// 
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/12/10/China_accounting_scandal_SEC_Baidu. 
 31.  Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui Guojia Baomi Ju Guojia Dang’an Ju 
Zhengjian Hui GongGao (2009) 29 Hao: Guanyu Jiaqiang Zai Jingwai Faxing Zhengquan Yu Shangshi 
Xiangguan Baomi he Dangan Guanli Gongzuo De Guiding (中国证券监督管理委员会 国家保密局 
国家档案局—-证监会公告[2009] 29号：关于加强在境外发行证券与上市相关保密和档案管理工
作的规定) [China Securities Regulatory Commission announcement No. 29 (2009): Provisions on 
Strengthening Confidentiality and Archives Administration in Overseas Issuance and Listing of 
Securities] (promulgated by the China Sec. Reg. Comm’n, Oct. 20, 2009, effective Oct. 20, 2009), 
available at http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2010/content_1620613.htm (“[W]here overseas listed 
companies provide or publicly disclose documents, materials, or other items related to state secrets to 
the relevant securities companies, securities service institutions, and overseas regulatory authorities, the 
said companies shall apply for the approval of competent departments with the authority of examination 
and approval.”).  Article 9 of the Law on Guarding State Secrets defines state secrets as “matters which, 
if divulged, would harm national security and interests in the areas of politics, economics, national 
defense, and diplomacy.”  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Baoshou Guojia Mimi Fa (中华人民共和国
保守国家秘密法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets] (promulgated by 
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Sept. 5, 1988, effective May 1, 1989, amended by the 
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The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has a 
statutory responsibility to inspect auditing of U.S.-listed companies that is 
conducted abroad.32  The PCAOB has reached inspection agreements with 
regulators in most major economies but not with China.33  The original 
deadline to complete these international inspections was extended from 
2008 to 2009 and again to December 31, 2012.34  The passing of the 
extended deadline raised the prospect of PCAOB deregistration of Chinese 
accounting firms, including the local affiliates of the Big Four.  On 
November 29, 2012, PCAOB Chairman James Doty stated, 
 
[W]e have not been allowed to inspect any Chinese [auditing] firms that 
are registered with us, notwithstanding the fact that those firms continue 
to issue audit reports that are filed with the SEC and relied on by U.S. 
investors. 
. . . . 
  At some point we must inspect [them] as part of our statutory 
duty . . . .  The firms, by the way, have gotten themselves into a pickle.35 
 
On May 7, 2013, the PCAOB and Chinese regulators concluded an 
agreement on enforcement cooperation.36  The agreement allows PCAOB 
access to auditor work papers for specific investigations, but disclosure of 
work papers to private litigants requires preapproval from Chinese 
regulators.37  The agreement does not allow PCAOB inspections of 
auditors.  It also does not apply to the SEC, which at the time of the 
agreement had pending administrative proceedings charging the Chinese 
affiliates of each of the Big Four with violations of the Securities Exchange 
 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Apr. 29, 2010, effective Oct. 1, 2010) 2010 STANDING COMM. 
NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 372.  But see Declaration of Donald Clarke at 3, U.S. SEC v. Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu CPA Ltd., 928 F. Supp. 2d 43 (2013) (Misc. No. 11-512 GK/DAR) (expressing the 
opinion that, for off-site inspections, Chinese law does not require pre-approval and that an auditor 
could make a judgment for itself that its work papers contain no state secrets). 
 32.  Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection (Sarbanes-Oxley) Act of 2002 § 
106, 15 U.S.C. § 7216 (2012), amended by Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010 §§ 929J, 982(g). 
 33.  Stanley Lubman, Single-Agency Oversight Could Help U.S.-China Auditing, WALL ST. J. 
CHINA REAL TIME (Dec. 28, 2012, 6:01 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/12/28/single-
agency-oversight-could-help-u-s-china-auditing/. 
 34.  PCAOB RULE 4003(g) (Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. 2011). 
 35.  Michael Cohn, PCAOB Chair Doty Warns Against Accounting Shortcuts, ACCT. TODAY 
(Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.accountingtoday.com/news/PCAOB-Chair-James-Doty-Warns-Auditing-
Shortcuts-64833-1.html. 
 36.  Memorandum of Understanding on Enforcement Cooperation, U.S.-China, May 7, 2013, 
available at http://pcaobus.org/International/Documents/MOU_China.pdf. 
 37.  Id. art. VII. 
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Act and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for their refusal to provide the SEC with 
their audit work papers in relation to work performed for nine clients under 
investigation for fraud.38  The proceedings could disqualify the firms from 
auditing U.S.-listed companies.39 
Chinese companies that list on U.S. exchanges operate in a high fraud 
environment in which financial statements have low credibility.  A great 
many Chinese firms listing in the United States also escape Chinese 
regulation through VIEs and escape U.S. regulation through China’s 
reluctance to cooperate with U.S. regulators.  Unsurprisingly, financial 
statement frauds are a major problem.  For investors in U.S.-listed Chinese 
firms, a Big Four brand name may well be the only assurance against 
financial statement fraud available. 
II. THE LONGTOP FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGIES FRAUD 
Investors relied on the assurance of a Big Four brand name when they 
invested billions in Longtop.  They lost everything, but the auditor escaped 
any liability.  Examination of the Longtop fraud and the dismissal of claims 
against Longtop’s auditor highlights the legal obstacles that investors face 
when they seek to hold auditors liable for failing to conduct a proper audit 
of a U.S.-listed Chinese firm.  Paradoxically, the law makes it more 
difficult to hold auditors liable for poor quality audits in precisely the 
circumstances in which audit quality is the only available assurance against 
fraud. 
A. The Longtop Fraud 
Longtop is a Cayman Islands corporation with operations located in 
Xiamen, China, offering technology services to Chinese banks.40  Through 
a VIE structure, Longtop held its IPO on the NYSE on October 25, 2007, 
and a secondary offering on November 23, 2009.41  Longtop’s external 
auditor was Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu CPA Ltd. (DTTC), Deloitte’s China 
affiliate, which issued unqualified audit opinions on Longtop’s financial 
statements and, in a prospectus filed with the SEC, consented to the use of 
its audit reports to support Longtop’s security offerings.42 
Citron Research is a short-selling firm that researches public company 
 
 38.  BDO China Dahua CPA Co., Exchange Act Release No. 68,335, 105 SEC Docket 302 (Dec. 
3, 2012) (instituting administrative proceedings).  The SEC also charged the Chinese affiliate of BDO, 
the fifth-largest global auditor.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at 5. 
 40.  In re Longtop Fin. Techs. Ltd. Sec. Litig., 910 F. Supp. 2d 561, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 41.  Longtop Fin. Techs. Ltd., Prospectus Supplement (Form 424B5) (Nov. 17, 2009). 
 42.  In re Longtop Fin. Techs. Ltd. Sec. Litig., 910 F. Supp. 2d at 567. 
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financial disclosures, identifies companies with questionable financial 
reporting, takes a short position in them, and then discloses its research to 
the market.43  On April 26, 2011, Citron Research published a report on its 
website stating, “It is the opinion of Citron that every financial statement 
[of Longtop] from its IPO to this date is fraudulent.”44  Citron noted that 
Longtop’s gross and operating margins, 62.5% and 49%, respectively, 
greatly exceeded peer companies’ gross and operating margins, which were 
15–50% and 10–25%, respectively.45  Longtop claimed that gross margins 
on its software sales were 90% and that it had achieved these margins 
through an outsourcing arrangement.46 
Citron researched the outsourcing arrangement and discovered that the 
margins had been achieved by transferring operating costs to an off-
balance-sheet entity, which had been excluded from Longtop’s financial 
statements but was clearly a related party.  As of March 31, 2010, Longtop 
had 4258 employees, 76% of whom were employed through a single 
human resources staffing company: Xiamen Longtop Human Resources 
Company (XLHRS).47  Longtop was XLHRS’s only customer.48  Despite 
this, Longtop had no long-term contract with XLHRS, and XLHRS never 
solicited any other clients.49  XLHRS had been formed five months before 
Longtop’s IPO, was located in the same building as Longtop, and shared 
Longtop’s email servers.50  Finally, when the relationship between Longtop 
and XLHRS was challenged, Longtop terminated it and directly employed 
the employees formerly employed through XLHRS.51 
The Citron report also raised questions about Longtop’s leadership.  
Chairman Xiaogong Jia and Chief Executive Officer Weizhou Lian had 
previously been charged with fraud in Chinese proceedings.52  Chairman 
Xiaogong Jia (also known as Ka Hiu Kung) claimed to have given 70% of 
his stock holdings, valued at approximately $250 million dollars, as a gift 
to employees and friends.53  Citron expressed the opinion that this 
transaction in fact paid off Longtop’s hidden liabilities or had some ulterior 
 
 43.   Id. at 568. 
 44.  Citron Reports on Longtop Financial, CITRON RES. (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www. 
citronresearch.com/citron-reports-on-longtop-financial-nyselft/. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
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motive.54 
Release of this report caused Longtop’s share price to decline by 
26%.55  Longtop responded with an investor call two days after the report’s 
release.56  During the call, Chief Financial Officer Derek Palaschuk denied 
any wrongdoing.57  He pointed to DTTC’s unqualified audit opinions and 
stated that those questioning Longtop’s financials “were ‘criticizing the 
integrity of one of the top accounting firms in the world.’”58  He went on to 
say, “[T]he most important relations I have [are] with my family, my 
C.E.O., and then the next on the list is Deloitte as our auditor, because their 
trust and support is [sic] extremely important.”59 
Within a month of this conference call, DTTC resigned as Longtop’s 
auditor, and the NYSE halted trading in Longtop’s American Depositary 
Shares.60  DTTC’s resignation letter claimed that it had determined that 
further bank balance confirmations were necessary and that these further 
confirmations had revealed fictitious deposit balances and unreported loan 
liabilities.61  On May 17, 2011, DTTC attempted to confirm balances 
through bank headquarters instead of local branches.62  DTTC claimed that 
Longtop had obstructed this process by telling the bank headquarters that 
DTTC was not in fact its auditor and that it had detained DTTC audit 
files.63 
DTTC was well aware that financial statement frauds involving forged 
bank statements and local bank branch collusion are common in China.  
China MediaExpress, also audited by DTTC, also engaged in this type of 
fraud.64  Other examples include China Century Dragon Media, Inc., China 
Intelligent Lighting and Electronics, Inc., and NIVS Intellimedia 
Technology Group, Inc.65  In the case of the China MediaExpress fraud, 
when DTTC requested that confirmations be made by the bank 
 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  In re Longtop Fin. Techs. Ltd. Sec. Litig., 910 F. Supp. 2d 561, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Norris, supra note 16. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  In re Longtop Fin. Techs. Ltd. Sec. Litig., 910 F. Supp. 2d at 568. 
 61.  Id. at 568–69; see also Consolidated Class Action Complaint ¶ 48, id. (No. 11-cv-3658-SAS) 
(noting that another short-seller, Bronte Capital, questioned the secondary offering when the company 
had already had enough cash on hand to fund operations for 26 quarters). 
 62.  Norris, supra note 16. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Paul Gillis, Auditing Cash in China, CHINA ACCT. BLOG (Apr. 20, 2011, 8:49 PM), 
http://www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/auditing-cash-in-china.html. 
 65.  Id. 
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headquarters and not the local branch, China MediaExpress refused, and 
DTTC resigned.66  Likewise, in the case of the Longtop fraud, DTTC 
resigned as Longtop’s auditor and declared Longtop’s previous financial 
statements to be no longer reliable.67 
B. Taking Deloitte to Court 
Unsurprisingly, a securities class action was filed against Longtop, 
DTTC, and DTTC’s umbrella entity, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu CPA Ltd. 
(DTT).68  The complaint alleged that DTTC had violated SEC Rule 10b-5 
and that DTT had violated Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.69  SEC Rule 10b-5 prohibits acts or omissions resulting in fraud or 
deceit in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.70  Section 
20(a) provides liability for persons who control persons who violate any 
provision of the Securities Exchange Act or any rule thereunder.71  The 
complaint alleged that DTTC had recklessly failed to investigate Longtop’s 
bank and loan balances adequately and had recklessly failed to detect the 
transfer of costs to the unreported related entity XLHRS.72 
DTTC moved to dismiss for failure to plead a strong inference of 
scienter as required by the PSLRA.73  The PSLRA imposes on plaintiffs 
both a heightened pleading standard and a stay on discovery pending 
resolution of a defendant’s motion to dismiss.74  Under the heightened 
standard, plaintiffs must allege “with particularity facts giving rise to a 
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”75  
The Supreme Court held in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder—nearly twenty 
years before the PSLRA—that scienter is the required state of mind for 
liability under Rule 10b-5.76  Since that case, courts have consistently held 
 
 66.  Id.  That fraud was also exposed by Citron Research.  Jason Raznick, Is China MediaExpress 
a Fraud? Part 1, FORBES, Feb. 7, 2011, 11:16 AM, http://www.forbes.com/sites/benzingainsights/2011/ 
02/07/is-china-mediaexpress-a-fraud-part-1/. 
 67.  In re Longtop Fin. Techs. Ltd. Sec. Litig., 910 F. Supp. 2d 561, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 68.  See infra Part III.B (discussing DTT’s function in the context of the Parmalat case). 
 69.  In re Longtop Fin. Techs. Ltd. Sec. Litig., 910 F. Supp. 2d at 566–67.  Claims under Section 
11 of the Securities Act of 1933 were not brought, presumably because the statute of limitations had 
run.  See infra notes 364–69 and accompanying text. 
 70.  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014). 
 71.  15 U.S.C. § 78t (2012). 
 72.  In re Longtop Fin. Techs. Ltd. Sec. Litig., 910 F. Supp. 2d at 570. 
 73.  Id. at 571–72. 
 74.  § 101(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2012). 
 75.  § 101(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2). 
 76.  425 U.S. 185, 212–15 (1976). 
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that recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement.77  So, under the 
PSLRA, plaintiffs bringing Rule 10b-5 suits against auditors must plead 
particular facts creating a “strong inference” of auditor recklessness while 
discovery is stayed. 
The court quickly disposed of plaintiffs’ allegations that DTTC had 
failed to conform to Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) when 
conducting its audit and that its failure had been so egregious as to amount 
to recklessness.78  The plaintiffs characterized Citron’s points about 
XLHRS as six “red flags” and alleged that even a “perfunctory review” 
would have revealed (1) that XLHRS had been formed shortly before 
Longtop’s IPO, (2) that XLHRS had not been mentioned in Longtop’s 
filings until 2009, (3) that XLHRS had occupied the same building with 
Longtop, (4) that XLHRS had shared the “Longtop” name, (5) that XLHRS 
had had no customers other than Longtop, and (6) that XLHRS had shared 
Longtop’s email server.79  They alleged that these “red flags” had been so 
obvious that DTTC must have been aware of them and had thus been 
reckless when it failed to address them in its audits.80 
The court rejected this allegation with surprising reasoning.  It found 
only three of those “red flags” to be so obvious that Deloitte must have 
noticed them: 1) XLHRS’s formation shortly before Longtop’s IPO, 2) an 
allegation that XLHRS had not been mentioned in Longtop’s financials 
before 2009, and 3) the fact that XLHRS shared the name “Longtop.”81  
One “red flag” excluded from this list is the fact that XLHRS shared the 
same building in Xiamen as Longtop.  It is impossible to understand how 
this would not have been obvious to an onsite auditor. 
Considering the three “red flags” it conceded as obvious, the court 
stated, “The fact that XLHRS was formed shortly before Longtop’s IPO, 
and that it had ‘Longtop’ in its name, would not lead a reasonable auditor 
to suspect wrongdoing, given that this sort of staffing arrangement is 
common.”82  The court provided no argument or authority to support this 
statement, which lacks support because it is manifestly false: it is not at all 
common for a company to obtain three-quarters of its employees from an 
 
 77.  See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3 (2007) (“Every 
Court of Appeals that has considered the issue has held that a plaintiff may meet the scienter 
requirement by showing that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly . . . .”). 
 78.  See infra Part III.A (explaining that alleged nonconformity with professional standards fails to 
meet the scienter pleading requirement for Rule 10b-5 actions). 
 79.  Consolidated Class Action Complaint, supra note 61, ¶¶ 135–36. 
 80.  Id. ¶¶ 136–37. 
 81.  In re Longtop Fin. Techs. Sec. Litig., 910 F. Supp. 2d at 570. 
 82.  Id. at 576. 
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unrelated entity that shares the company’s name and building and that was 
formed immediately prior to the company’s IPO.  It is precisely because 
this is uncommon that Citron’s research discovered that XLHRS was not an 
unrelated entity but instead a vehicle for concealing expenses.  The court’s 
offhand dismissal of the “red flags” as “red herrings”83 is difficult to 
reconcile with the fact that those “red herrings” led Citron, a securities 
research firm, to invest its own money in short positions in the belief that 
they demonstrated Longtop to be a fraud. 
The court refused to consider the short-seller reports as evidence 
supporting an inference of recklessness by Deloitte.84  While they are 
certainly not dispositive on that question, the fact that the fraud was so 
obvious that a short-seller who had never been to China detected it even 
though professional, onsite audits over several years by a Chinese auditor 
operating under policies set by Deloitte failed to do so is surely 
circumstantial evidence supporting an inference of recklessness by DTTC. 
The Longtop plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, with additional 
information obtained through discovery in proceedings against Mr. 
Palaschuk, but this was dismissed on April 8, 2013, for “the same defects 
laboriously identified in the Dismissal Opinion” and without leave for 
further amendment.85  The court noted that the plaintiffs had failed to state 
a claim despite “access to copious discovery in crafting the Amended 
Complaint,” despite the fact that the plaintiffs, like the SEC, had had no 
access to Deloitte’s working papers.86 
Section 20(a) claims against DTT were voluntarily dismissed without 
prejudice a few months before the dismissal of claims against DTTC.87  
Regardless, they necessarily would have been dismissed as well because 
the secondary liability claims against DTT under Section 20(a) were based 
on DTTC’s alleged primary violation.88  An SEC investigation against 
 
 83.  Id. at 577. 
 84.  Id. at 577–78. 
 85.  In re Longtop Fin. Techs. Sec. Litig., 939 F. Supp. 2d 360, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 86.  Id.  Several months after the dismissal of claims against DTTC in Longtop, the SEC received 
“a substantial volume of documents . . . including the DTTC audit workpapers and certain other 
documents related to Longtop.”  SEC, Joined by Deloitte China, Files a Motion to Dismiss Without 
Prejudice the Subpoena Enforcement Action, Litigation Release No. 22,911, Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Release No. 3531 (Jan. 27, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/ 
2014/lr22911.htm.  This occurred less than a week after an SEC administrative law judge suspended the 
affiliates of each of the Big Four firms.  BDO China Dahua CPA Co. Ltd., Initial Decision Release No. 
553 (ALJ Jan. 22, 2014), available at https://www.sec.gov/alj/aljdec/2014/id553ce.pdf. 
 87.  Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice of Defendants Thomas Gurnee and Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu Limited at 1, In re Longtop Fin. Techs. Sec. Litig., No. 11-cv-3658-SAS (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 28, 2012). 
 88.  A primary violator is a required by Section 20(a).  15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2012). 
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DTTC for its conduct in the Longtop case is ongoing as of January 2014.89 
C. Why Deloitte Escaped the Possibility of Liability 
The court concluded its opinion by finding that the facts alleged led to 
a “compelling and stronger inference that DTTC [had] performed a diligent 
audit, only to be duped by Longtop’s fraud.”90  The plaintiffs lost under the 
PSLRA’s heightened pleading standard for scienter.  The court found it 
more compelling to assume Deloitte to be a victim of the fraud.  In light of 
the facts of the case, this result seems stunning, and it is worth examining 
the factors that led to it. 
The plaintiffs argued that DTTC was reckless in not identifying 
XLHRS as a related-party by 1) giving lengthy quotations from, and 
paraphrases of, auditing standards,91 2) repeating “red flags” identified by 
short-selling equities researchers, and 3) concluding that even a 
“perfunctory review” by DTTC would have exposed those flags.”92  
DTTC’s review, therefore, had been less-than-perfunctory.  Since a less-
than-perfunctory review is clearly inconsistent with auditing standards, the 
plaintiffs concluded that DTTC must have known that it was obligated to 
do more “to identify and conduct procedures aimed at uncovering related-
party transactions”93 and that DTTC had nonetheless recklessly failed “to 
undertake any meaningful investigation.”94 
This argument was inadequate.  Nonconformity with auditing 
standards will not establish an inference of scienter.95  Undoubtedly, 
plaintiff’s counsel was hindered by the inability under the PSLRA to 
conduct discovery before pleading particular facts.  But crucial details that 
would have explained why those “red flags” gave rise to a “strong 
inference” of scienter were omitted: for example, the definition of a related 
party or the fact that audits are onsite inspections (so that Deloitte must 
have known that XLHRS had shared a building with Longtop).  Most 
importantly, instead of merely quoting professional standards, the plaintiffs 
could have also described the procedure by which an auditor performs a 
 
 89.  See Litigation Release No. 22,911, supra note 86 (noting the delivery of documents “in 
connection with the SEC’s investigation into possible fraud by DTTC’s former audit client, China-
based Longtop Financial Technologies Limited”). 
 90.  In re Longtop Fin. Techs. Sec. Litig., 910 F. Supp. 2d at 581. 
 91.  Consolidated Class Action Complaint, supra note 61, ¶¶ 123–34; see also In re Longtop Fin. 
Techs. Sec. Litig., 910 F. Supp. 2d at 575–76, 581 (referring to “the Complaint’s laundry list of auditing 
standards” and “general recitations of accounting standards”). 
 92.  Consolidated Class Action Complaint, supra note 61, ¶¶ 135–36. 
 93.  Id. ¶ 136. 
 94.  Id. ¶ 137. 
 95.  See infra Part III.A. 
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review, pointing out the many ways in which a standard review procedure 
necessarily would have identified XLHRS as a related party and supporting 
an inference that DTTC had chosen not to review Longtop’s accounts as 
required and therefore had acted with scienter.96 
In addition, China’s high-fraud reputation may have affected the 
court: operating in a perceived accounting battlefield might increase 
sympathy for auditors in fraud actions.97  This sympathy could well be 
toxic when combined with the heightened scienter-pleading requirement’s 
effect of forcing the court to speculate apologies for the defendant’s 
behavior. 
Furthermore, although the PSLRA does not distinguish between 
auditors and other defendants regarding scienter, courts often do.98  They 
often assume auditors to be highly rational actors with no economic 
incentive to perform fraudulent audits.99  A judicial presumption that 
auditors simply are not reckless is indeed a difficult hurdle for any plaintiff 
to overcome.  This presumption may result from courts’ failure to properly 
consider important features of the auditing industry, such as its 
oligopolistic nature and the revolving door connecting auditors with their 
clients.100  The audit profession’s seventy years of closing the “expectations 
gap” by lowering expectations that auditors should find fraud has been at 
least as important in creating the presumption against auditor 
recklessness.101  A failure to discover fraud is not likely to create a “strong 
inference” of scienter when the expectation that fraud should have been 
discovered is low. 
III. AUDITORS’ LEGAL LIABILITY FOR FINANCIAL STATEMENT 
FRAUD 
When auditors issue unqualified opinions to investors concerning a 
public company’s fraudulent financial statements, they potentially face 
liability to persons using those statements.  Investors may bring an action 
under SEC Rule 10b-5.  The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act 
of 1998 confers on federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over class action 
 
 96.  For examples of procedures used to identify related parties and transactions with related 
parties, see RELATED PARTIES, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 122, §§ 550 (Am. Inst. of Certified 
Pub. Accountants 2012). 
 97.  See supra Part I (describing pervasive fraud in China). 
 98.  Gideon Mark, Accounting Fraud: Pleading Scienter of Auditors Under the PSLRA, 39 CONN. 
L. REV. 1097, 1210. 
 99.  Id. at 1174–76. 
 100.  Id. at 1180–1202. 
 101.  See infra Part IV.B. 
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suits involving listed securities and seeking damages on behalf of more 
than fifty people.102  Auditors can also be subject to liability in a derivative 
shareholder action for a breach of their duty to the client corporation.  
Though a derivative action on behalf of a Chinese corporation103 or liability 
to a bankruptcy trustee is possible in the aftermath of fraud orchestrated by 
senior management and enabled by auditor collusion or negligence,104 these 
are beyond the scope of this Note.  But within that scope are the two 
auditor-liability issues that thwarted Longtop’s investors’ claims.  The first 
issue is the relation of the PSLRA’s heightened scienter pleading 
requirement to auditor liability.  The second is the legal structure of the 
auditing profession, which isolates liability to a single network affiliate.  
Ironically, the success of this structure in containing liability can be seen in 
In re Parmalat Securities Litigation,105 a case in which a global auditing 
network was exposed to liability for the actions of a network affiliate. 
A. Pleading Scienter 
Rule 10b-5 actions have required an allegation of scienter since the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.106  Scienter is 
intent by the defendant to defraud.107  The Court did not decide whether 
recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement, but subsequent decisions 
have held uniformly that it does.108  What generally constitutes recklessness 
under Rule 10b-5 may not be clear,109 but for auditors, a standard rooted in 
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche110 has emerged as a consensus in the circuits. 
Chief Judge Cardozo held in Ultramares that, although third parties 
 
 102.  Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (amending scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 103.  See Batchelder v. Kawamoto, 147 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that an American 
Depositary Receipt holder lacks standing to bring a shareholder derivative action on behalf of an 
overseas corporation when governing foreign law limits standing to shareholders of record); infra Part I 
(describing the variable interest entity structure commonly used, in lieu of direct listing, by Chinese 
firms listed in the United States). 
 104.  For a recent and comprehensive treatment of such liability, see Christine M. Shepard, Note, 
Corporate Wrongdoing and the In Pari Delicto Defense in Auditor Malpractice Cases, 69 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 275 (2012). 
 105.  594 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 106.  425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
 107.  Id. at 193 n.12.  The Court left open the possibility that recklessness can satisfy the scienter 
requirement.  Id. 
 108.  Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3 (2007) (“Every Court of 
Appeals that has considered the issue has held that a plaintiff may meet the scienter requirement by 
showing that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly . . . .”). 
 109.  MELVIN ARON EISENBERG & JAMES D. COX, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 883 (10th ed. 2011). 
 110.  174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1932). 
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relying on an audit report could not bring tort actions against the auditors 
for negligence,111 the auditors could, if they “acted without information 
leading to a sincere or genuine belief” and “closed their eyes to the 
obvious,” be liable to those third parties for fraudulent misrepresentation.112  
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
drew on Ultramares to define accounting recklessness as “[a] refusal to see 
the obvious, a failure to investigate the doubtful, if sufficiently gross.”113  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also adopted the 
Ultramares line for reckless scienter in auditor liability cases post-
Hochfelder: “It seems to us that the purpose of footnote 12 of the 
Hochfelder opinion was to preserve, at least in the context of accountants’ 
liability, the standards of scienter developed in Ultramares . . . .”114  For 
purposes of auditor liability, the Ultramares standard of scienter also 
satisfies the Franke standard of recklessness adopted in Sundstrand.115  In 
SEC v. Price Waterhouse,116 the Southern District of New York drew on 
McLean, Sundstrand, and other cases to hold that that an auditor is reckless 
only when 
 
the accounting practices were so deficient that the audit amounted to no 
audit at all, or “an egregious refusal to see the obvious, or to investigate 
the doubtful,” or that the accounting judgments which were made were 
such that no reasonable accountant would have made the same decisions 
if confronted with the same facts.117 
 
 111.  Id. at 447. 
 112.  Id. at 449. 
 113.  Jordan v. Madison Leasing Co., 596 F. Supp. 707, 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (quoting State St. 
Trust Co. v. Ernst, 15 N.E.2d 416, 419).  State Street Trust Co. cited Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 449, as 
the source of this definition.  For another case adopting this standard in the Southern District of New 
York, see Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 762 F. Supp. 599, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(quoting Goldman v. McMahan, Brafman, Morgan & Co., 706 F. Supp. 256, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)) 
(“[A]n egregious refusal to see the obvious, or to investigate the doubtful, may in some cases give rise 
to an inference of gross negligence which can be the functional equivalent of recklessness.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 114.  McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1198 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 115.  Id.  Under the Franke standard, “reckless conduct may be defined as a highly unreasonable 
omission, involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable, negligence, but an extreme departure from 
the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either 
known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.”  Franke v. 
Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (citing Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 190 n.5 (1976); Beecher v. Able, Nos. 66 Civ. 3471, 66 Civ. 3382, 66 Civ. 
3775, 1975 WL 420 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 1975); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF 
TORTS 185–86 (4th ed. 1971)).  The Seventh Circuit adopted the Franke standard in Sundstrand Corp. 
v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 116.  797 F. Supp. 1217 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 117.  Id. at 1240 (citations omitted). 
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The United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth 
Circuits have adopted this standard, which now appears to be the consensus 
standard for auditor recklessness.118 
The PSLRA requires plaintiffs to plead with particularity facts giving 
rise to a “strong inference” of scienter.119  This means facts that constitute 
direct evidence of scienter, circumstantial evidence of scienter, or the 
defendant’s motive and opportunity to commit fraud.120  In an action 
against an auditor of a foreign company, however, direct evidence of 
scienter is unlikely to be available, especially when both the auditor and the 
audited company are in China.121  Nor is motive and opportunity likely to 
evidence scienter, since auditors generally do not buy or sell shares in the 
companies they audit.122  So actions against auditors generally must plead 
detailed facts showing circumstantial evidence of scienter.  Recognizing 
this, the Third Circuit in McLean v. Alexander noted that 
 
[c]ircumstantial evidence may often be the principal, if not the only, 
means of proving bad faith.  A showing of shoddy accounting practices 
amounting at best to a “pretended audit,” or of grounds supporting a 
representation “so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that there was no 
genuine belief back of it” have traditionally supported a finding of 
liability in the face of repeated assertions of good faith, and continue to 
do so.  In such cases, the factfinder may justifiably conclude that despite 
those assertions the “danger of misleading . . . (was) so obvious that the 
actor must have been aware of it.”123 
 
After the enactment of the PSLRA, the Supreme Court held in Tellabs, 
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. that the Act’s heightened standard 
requires a court considering a motion to dismiss a complaint to first 
determine “whether all of the facts alleged, taken collectively, give rise to a 
 
 118.  See Dronsejko v. Grant Thornton, 632 F.3d 658, 665 (10th Cir. 2011); PR Diamonds, Inc. v. 
Chandler, 364 F.3d 671, 693–94 (6th Cir. 2004); In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 
1426 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 119.  § 101(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2012). 
 120.  EISENBERG & COX, supra note 109, at 884. 
 121.  The PSLRA bars pre-trial discovery until after resolution of a motion to dismiss.  § 101(b), 15 
U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B). 
 122.  See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT ET § 101.02 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 
2013) (declaring that the independence of a CPA is considered impaired if he or she had any direct 
material financial interest in the client). 
 123.  599 F.2d 1190, 1198 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 
1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977); O’Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1937); Ultramares Corp. v. 
Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 447 (N.Y. 1931)). 
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strong inference of scienter.”124  If they do, the court must then engage in a 
“comparative inquiry” to determine “if a reasonable person would deem the 
inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing 
inference one could draw from the facts alleged.”125  Thus, courts must now 
engage in the “comparative inquiry” well before any trial.  A showing of 
“shoddy accounting practices” no longer suffices even to get to discovery if 
opposing inferences can be proffered that, for some reason, appear more 
“compelling” to the judge deciding a motion to dismiss. 
Under the PSLRA, plaintiffs must meet this fuzzy standard before 
proceeding to any pre-trial discovery.  This limitation obviously reduces 
the likelihood of succeeding in an action against an auditor.  Yet it is 
equally important that the recklessness standard adopted by the circuits 
does not hinge on professional standards.  Hence, alleging failure to 
conform to professional standards will be insufficient to show scienter.  
Through Hochfelder’s footnote 12, the circuits have adopted Chief Judge 
Cardozo’s standard from Ultramares, rather than the professional standards 
evolved in response to that standard. 
B. Accounting Networks and Vicarious Liability 
The largest auditors in the United States, the Big Four, are limited 
liability partnerships (LLPs) and members of global accounting networks.  
The LLP became available for U.S. auditors in the early 1990s in response 
to Texas lawsuits against lawyers and auditors, and now all large auditors 
are LLPs.126  In an LLP, no partner has personal liability for malpractice 
claims against any other partner.127  Internationally, audit firms organize as 
professional services networks of separate national firms.128  Accounting 
firms achieved quick, global growth by using a model similar to 
franchising.129  To expand into new national markets, firms contract with 
local firms.130  The local firm receives a license to the international firm’s 
trademark and other intellectual property and agrees to contribute money 
 
 124.  551 U.S. 308, 322–23 (2007). 
 125.  Id. at 324. 
 126.  See Robert W. Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: Present at the Birth 
(Nearly), 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 1065, 1069–71 (1995) (describing the emergence of LLP legislation in 
response to suits against law firms and accounting firms after savings and loan failures in Texas). 
 127.  UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 306(c) (1997). 
 128.  Occasionally, firms do span borders.  For example, KPMG has merged many of its European 
and Middle Eastern member firms into KPMG Europe LLP.  See About, KPMG EUROPE LLP, 
http://www.kpmg.com/eu/en/about/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 1, 2013). 
 129.  Daniel Allen & Mindy Haverson, Note, An Alternative Approach to Vicarious Liability for 
International Accounting Firm Networks, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 426, 429–30 (2010). 
 130.  Id. 
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and support to the network and to maintain the standards of quality 
specified by network policies.131  A separate international umbrella entity 
sets strategy, develops and implements policies, and promulgates brand and 
quality standards.132  The umbrella entities of global accounting networks 
must exercise some amount of control over the member firms to which they 
have licensed their trademark.133  If such control creates an agency 
relationship between the umbrella entity and member firms, the umbrella 
entity could be exposed to vicarious liability for the actions of its member 
firms under a “one firm” theory resting on agency law or controlling-
person liability under Section 20(a).  The largest network member might in 
turn face similar liability if it controls the umbrella entity. 
This possibility became reality for Deloitte in the Parmalat case.134  
Parmalat appears to be an outlier, however.  The great majority of cases on 
this issue teach that that the failure of one network firm to meet its duty to 
provide reasonable assurance against material misstatements in audited 
financial statements does not impose vicarious liability on its umbrella 
entity or on other network affiliates.135 
Parmalat was a multinational Italian dairy corporation.136  In the 
1990s, it needed large amounts of cash to cover losses in South America 
and embezzlement by its chief executive officer and to service its debt.137  
Together with its auditor, Grant Thornton S.p.A., it created a scheme of 
fictitious transactions to hide its financial difficulties in order to obtain 
more loans.138  But Italian law required Parmalat to rotate auditors in 
1999.139  Parmalat moved the fictitious transactions to a Caribbean entity 
for which Grant Thornton remained the auditor and hired Deloitte & 
Touche, S.p.A. (Deloitte Italy) as its auditor.140 
Deloitte Italy is the Italian member of the Deloitte accounting 
network.  Deloitte’s international umbrella entity was Deloitte Touche 
 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  See How We Are Structured: What is “PwC”?, PWC, http://www.pwc.com/structure (last 
visited Jan. 1, 2013), for a description of the function of an umbrella entity and its relation to member 
firms.  Deloitte also has an English private company umbrella entity.  About Deloitte, DELOITTE, 
http://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/pages/about-deloitte/articles/about-deloitte.html (last visited June 
22, 2014). 
 133.  Allen & Haverson, supra note 129, at 431–32. 
 134.  In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 594 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 135.  See infra notes 150–52 and accompanying text. 
 136.  594 F. Supp. 2d at 447. 
 137.  Id. at 447–48. 
 138.  Id. at 448. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. 
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Tohmatsu (DTT), a Swiss verein headquartered in New York alongside 
Deloitte & Touche LLP (DT-US), Deloitte’s U.S. member firm.141  Despite 
the scale of the fraud, which included forged bank statements showing 
fictitious balances of several billion euros, Deloitte Italy continued to give 
Parmalat unqualified audit opinions.142  Eventually, the scheme collapsed.  
DTT, DT-US, and the chief executive officer of DTT, among others, were 
sued in a securities class action in the Southern District of New York by 
purchasers of Parmalat securities in the period for which Deloitte had 
audited Parmalat.143  The plaintiffs argued that DTT and DT-US were 
vicariously liable for Deloitte Italy’s actions under Rule 10b-5 through the 
principle of respondeat superior, as well as under Section 20(a).144 
The district court applied New York agency law to find that DTT had 
a principal-agent relationship with Deloitte Italy.  It found that DTT 
exercised control in part because it controlled acceptance of client 
engagements by member firms, arbitrated disputes between them, and set 
policies and standards binding on the conduct of Deloitte Italy’s client 
engagements.145  Citing Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Alitalia 
Airlines, S.p.A., the court stated, “An agency relationship exists under New 
York law when there is an agreement between the principal and the agent 
that the agent will act for the principal, and the principal retains a degree of 
control over the agent.”146  However, the elements presented in 
Commercial Union Insurance Co. for such a relationship are “(1) the 
principal’s manifestation of intent to grant authority to the agent . . . (2) 
agreement by the agent. . . .  [, and (3)] the principal must maintain control 
over key aspects of the undertaking.”147  It is not obvious that DTT 
manifested an intent to grant authority to Deloitte Italy or that Deloitte Italy 
agreed to such a grant.  The court’s opinion did not address this question 
but instead focused on whether DTT controlled Deloitte Italy. 
 
 141.  Id. at 447.  A Swiss verein is a voluntary association form of legal entity intended for non-
profit organizations but available for commercial purposes.  Megan E. Vetula, Note, From the Big Four 
to Big Law: The Swiss Verein and the Global Law Firm, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1177, 1181 (2009).  
It has limited liability among associates.  Id.  DTT is no longer a verein.  Andrew Clark, Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu Quits Swiss System to Make UK Its New Legal Home, GUARDIAN, Sept. 20, 2010, 
14:27 EDT, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/sep/20/deloitte-touche-tohmatsu-legal-registrati 
on-london. 
 142.  594 F. Supp. 2d at 447–48. 
 143.  Id. at 449. 
 144.  Id. at 447. 
 145.  Id. at 455. 
 146.  Id. at 451 (footnote omitted) (citing 347 F.3d 448, 462 (2d Cir. 2003); N.Y. Marine & Gen. 
Ins. Co. v. Tradeline, LLC, 266 F.3d 112, 122 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
 147.  347 F.3d at 462. 
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The court gave many examples of control over policy, public 
relations, legal affairs, and intra-network dispute resolution.148  DTT had no 
authority, however, to direct or supervise any audit engagement conducted 
by any member firm.149  Had DTT been unhappy with a member firm’s 
conduct of an audit, it perhaps could have sanctioned that member 
according to the network agreements, but it could not have directed that the 
audit be conducted differently.  For this reason, the court’s finding on the 
question of umbrella-entity liability was contrary to many recent Southern 
District of New York decisions on the same question.  In In re Asia Pulp 
and Paper Securities Litigation, the Southern District of New York held 
that Arthur Andersen’s international umbrella entity did not have control 
over particular audits conducted by member firms; because it had no 
control over the transactions at issue, it had no liability for them under 
Section 20(a).150  In Nuevo Mundo Holdings v. Pricewaterhouse Coopers 
LLP, the Southern District of New York found that PwC’s global umbrella 
entity was not alleged to have been involved with decisions about how 
audit reports were completed and held that no principal-agent relationship 
existed.151  In In re WorldCom, Inc. Securities Litigation, the Southern 
District of New York held that Arthur Andersen’s and KPMG’s respective 
umbrella entities did not have principal-agent relationships with primary-
violator member firms because the umbrella entities lacked control over the 
members’ business activities.152 
The only case the Parmalat court cited against those contrary holdings 
was a case in a Florida state court: Banco Espirito Santo International, Ltd. 
v. BDO International, B.V.,153 which relied on Parker v. Domino’s Pizza, 
Inc., a Florida decision concerning an automobile injury tort action.154  The 
Parker court held that Domino’s Pizza had possibly created an agency 
relationship with a franchisee because it had directed the franchisee’s daily 
 
 148.  In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 594 F. Supp. 2d at 452–53. 
 149.  International umbrella entities do not practice accountancy.  See, e.g., About Deloitte, supra 
note 132 (stating that Deloitte’s umbrella entity “does not provide services to clients”).  Searching for 
Deloitte-branded registered auditors shows that Deloitte’s umbrella entity is not registered to provide 
audit services even in its new UK domicile.  See REGISTER OF STATUTORY AUDITORS, 
http://www.auditregister.org.uk/Forms/Default.aspx (last visited June 22, 2014). 
 150.  293 F. Supp. 2d 391, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 151.  No. 03 Civ. 0613 GBD, 2004 WL 112948, at *3–6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2004). 
 152.  No. 02 Civ. 3288(DLC), 2003 WL 21488087, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2003).  Furthermore, 
in two cases in the 1980s, the Southern District of New York rejected the agency theory presented in 
Parmalat.  See In re AM Int’l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 606 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Reingold v. Deloitte 
Haskins & Sells, 599 F. Supp. 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
 153.  594 F. Supp. 2d at 453 n.63 (citing 979 So. 2d 1030, 1033–34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)). 
 154.  979 So. 2d at 1034 (citing 629 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)). 
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operations—particularly the acts of its drivers—in a substantial way.155  
The applicability of Parker in the international accounting context is highly 
questionable,156 and the several decisions in the Southern District of New 
York on the question of vicarious liability within an international 
accounting network are more persuasive than Banco Espirito Santo.157 
The plaintiffs in Parmalat also argued that DTT had liability under 
Section 20(a).  Section 20(a) provides that persons 
 
who, directly or indirectly, control[] any person liable . . . shall also be 
liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled 
person . . . unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not 
directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the [primary 
violation].158 
 
The defendants argued that Section 20(a) requires control not only of the 
person but also of the transaction in question.159 
The court found that DTT had liability under Section 20(a) on two 
grounds.  It held that “the plain language of Section 20(a), requires control 
only of a person or entity liable under the chapter, not of the transaction 
constituting the violation.”160  If true, there would have been Section 20(a) 
liability since the court found that Deloitte Italy was an agent of DTT under 
New York agency law.  Yet the circuits are split on the test for Section 
20(a) liability.  The Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits use the culpable-
participation test161 applied by the Southern District of New York in Anwar 
 
 155.  See 629 So. 2d at 1027–28 (listing many examples of how Domino’s Pizza did direct the 
activities of franchisees’ drivers). 
 156.  The Middle District of Florida notably refused to apply Parker when a car rental franchise 
was alleged to have provided a defective car in an automobile injury tort action, a fact pattern far closer 
to Parker than that in Banco Espirito Santo.  Estate of Miller v. Thrifty Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 637 F. 
Supp. 2d 1029, 1042 (M.D. Fla. 2009). 
 157.  There are two cases that might have been cited in support of Parmalat but for the Second 
Circuit’s rule against citing unpublished opinions from unrelated cases from before 2007, but these are 
distinguished by their facts.  See Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of La. v. A.C.L.N., Ltd., No. 01 Civ. 11814(MP), 
2003 WL 21058090 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2003) (allowing claims to proceed against BDO’s umbrella 
entity where that entity was alleged to have signed the audit reports at issue); Cromer Fin. Ltd. v. 
Berger, Nos. 00 Civ. 2284(DLC), 00 Civ. 2498(DLC), 2002 WL 826847 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2002) 
(permitting a suit to proceed where a specific conveyance of actual authority was alleged); see also 
Colter Paulson, Case Management in the Sixth Circuit: Unpublished Opinions, SIXTH CIRCUIT APP. 
BLOG (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/news-and-analysis/case-management-
in-the-sixth-circuit-unpublished-opinions/ (describing the Second Circuit rule). 
 158.  15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2012). 
 159.  In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 594 F. Supp. 2d 444, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 160.  Id. at 456 (citing In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 474 F. Supp. 2d 547, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)). 
 161.  Erin L. Massey, Control Person Liability Under Section 20(a): Striking a Balance of Interests 
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v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd.,162 an action related to the Bernie Madoff Ponzi 
scheme.  There, the court held, 
 
[T]he question of whether a plaintiff must plead culpable participation to 
state a § 20(a) claim has, in this Court’s view, largely been settled by the 
Second Circuit in numerous decisions, and that the weight of opinion of 
district courts concurs with the standard previously articulated and 
applied by this Court, the Court declines to apply Parmalat.  Hence, in 
order to plead control, a plaintiff must plead that the defendant had 
actual control over the primary violator and transaction at issue.163 
 
The culpable-participation test requires 1) that the defendant actually 
controlled the primary violator and 2) that the defendant culpably 
participated in the fraud.164  Other circuits apply the potential-control test 
advanced by the Parmalat court.165  The most widely adopted version of 
that standard requires 1) that the defendant exercised control “in general” 
over the primary violator and 2) “possessed the power to control the 
specific transaction upon which the primary violation is predicated.”166 
Perhaps because its reading of Section 20(a) did run directly against 
Second Circuit case law,167 the Parmalat court also held that DTT might 
have had control of the transactions at issue (Deloitte Italy’s audit 
opinions), so its liability under Section 20(a) did not hinge on whether 
Section 20(a) requires such control.168  Under either test, however, Section 
20(a) liability is dubious for the same reason that liability under a 
respondeat superior theory is dubious: DTT lacked the ability to control 
the conduct of any audit. 
Plaintiffs also argued that DT-US had vicarious liability because it 
controlled DTT.169  The court’s reasoning on this issue is tenuous.  It found 
 
for Plaintiffs and Defendants, 6 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 109, 114–15 (2005). 
 162.  728 F. Supp. 2d 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 163.  Id. at 425 (citation omitted). 
 164.  Massey, supra note 161, at 114–15. 
 165.  Id. at 118. 
 166.  Id. (quoting Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 630–31 (8th Cir. 1985)) (internal quotation mark 
omitted). 
 167.  See ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 108 (2d Cir. 2007) (“To establish 
a prima facie case of control person liability, a plaintiff must show (1) a primary violation by the 
controlled person, (2) control of the primary violator by the defendant, and (3) that the defendant was, 
in some meaningful sense, a culpable participant in the controlled person’s fraud.” (emphasis added)).  
The emphasized phrase originated in Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973) (en 
banc). 
 168.  594 F. Supp. 2d 444, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 169.  Id. at 457. 
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no dispositive facts supporting the allegation that DT-US controlled DTT.  
It found only that DT-US partners held key leadership positions at DTT, 
that DT-US provided a large portion of DTT’s funding, and that there had 
been a single instance in which DT-US “may have influenced DTT’s 
decision making” on an issue entirely unrelated to audit practice.170  This 
was not a persuasive finding of a principal-agent relationship in the context 
of a professional-services network.  In such networks, it is very likely that 
several affiliates will provide partners for key leadership positions at the 
umbrella entity, will provide a large portion of its funding, and will 
influence its decision-making.171  It is unlikely that the general 
circumstances characteristic of a professional services network are also a 
totality of circumstances establishing vicarious liability between affiliates.  
This view is consistent with the other decisions of the Southern District of 
New York.172 
The decision in Parmalat to find vicarious liability under common law 
and under Section 20(a) for Deloitte’s U.S. affiliate and for its umbrella 
entity is an anomaly in recent case law on vicarious liability in accounting 
networks.  That Deloitte’s vicarious liability survived a motion to dismiss 
can be seen as an aberration unlikely to have survived appeal.  Under 
existing law and in the absence of unusual facts, actions against one 
affiliate will not result in liability for other affiliates or for the umbrella 
entity. 
IV. AUDITORS’ PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
FINANCIAL STATEMENT FRAUD 
A variety of actors rely on management-prepared financial statements 
to inform critical decisions: potential investors deciding whether to invest, 
current investors deciding whether to divest or to change management, 
financial institutions and trade suppliers deciding whether to extend credit 
 
 170.  Id. at 458–59. 
 171.  For example, all members of PwC’s Network Leadership Team, which “sets the strategy and 
standards that the PwC network will follow” are senior partners of network affiliates with the exception 
of the chairman, Dennis M. Nally, who was the senior partner of the U.S. affiliate prior to becoming 
chairman of the global network.  Governance Structures, PWC, http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/corporate-
governance/governance-structures.jhtml (last visited May 12, 2014); Network Leadership Team, PWC, 
http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/corporate-governance/network-leadership-team-governance-structure.jhtml 
(last visited May 18, 2014); Dennis M. Nally, PWC, http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/leadership/dennis-
nally.jhtml (last visited May 18, 2014). 
 172.  See Nuevo Mundo Holdings v. Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP, No. 03 Civ. 0613 GBD, 2004 
WL 112948, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2004) (rejecting similar arguments that the U.S. affiliates of PwC 
and Arthur Andersen had liability for their respective Peruvian network affiliates based on network 
connections without alleging any fact that would definitely show control). 
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and on what terms, current and potential customers or employees assessing 
the company’s viability for doing business, and governments for 
computation of taxes, among other users.173  Management has an incentive 
to supply only the information that it considers to be in its interests to 
supply, and market forces are unlikely to correct this in a timely fashion.174  
Regulation must therefore oblige management to produce financial 
statements that accurately provide the information needed by the users of 
its financial statements.175 
For public companies, a major form of such regulation is the 
requirement of a financial statement audit, which is performed by CPAs 
under promulgated standards.  A financial statement audit obtains and 
assesses evidence on whether a company’s financial statements fairly 
represent its financial position.176  Such audits must be conducted in 
accordance with GAAS.177  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, as amended, requires 
larger public companies in the United States to assess their internal controls 
over financial reporting and requires auditors to attest to those 
assessments.178 
Thus, law and public policy reflect the expectation that auditors will 
detect financial statement fraud.  This Part will consider, first, whether this 
is a reasonable expectation and, second, the history of the gap between this 
expectation, which Chief Justice Burger described as a “‘public watchdog’ 
function,”179 and the auditing profession’s own view of its responsibility.  
Over a century, reforms driven by accounting scandals have narrowed this 
gap.  Scandals involving U.S.-listed Chinese companies are yet another 
episode in this history.  Although the gap has narrowed—especially in the 
past twenty years—auditors have in the process obtained legal protections 
that effectively immunize them from liability for financial statement frauds 
by U.S.-listed Chinese companies. 
 
 173.  JOHN FLOWER WITH GABI EBBERS, GLOBAL FINANCIAL REPORTING 69–71 (2002). 
 174.  Id. at 73. 
 175.  Id. at 75. 
 176.  BOB LYKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21120, AUDITING AND ITS REGULATORS: REFORMS 
AFTER ENRON 1–2 (2003). 
 177.  Id. at 2. 
 178.  Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection (Sarbanes-Oxley) Act of 2002 § 
404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012), amended by Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010 § 989G(a) and Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 103 (2012). 
 179.  United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984). 
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A. Is It Reasonable to Expect Auditors to Detect Financial Statement 
Fraud? 
Users of financial statements, such as investors, expect audits to 
provide assurance against fraud.  This expectation is reasonable because 
investors have good reason to believe that a properly conducted audit 
would detect major financial statement fraud.180  GAAS prescribe a 
rigorous examination of the assertions made in a company’s financial 
statements: an audit is more than a reconciliation of management-prepared 
reports with management-maintained records.181  Auditors test details 
underlying asset and liability balances and transactions for existence, 
completeness, valuation, rights and obligations, and presentation.182  They 
confirm bank balances with banks, receivables balances with customers, 
count physical inventory, examine contracts and vendor invoices, and 
confirm titles, among many other common tests, which, in one version of 
the standard, number about two hundred.183  They perform analytical 
procedures to identify implausible or unexpected balances or transactions 
for scrutiny.184  
The reliability of such audits in the U.S. market buttresses this 
expectation’s reasonableness.  One way to examine audit reliability is to 
count financial restatements.  A financial restatement is the release of a 
previously-issued financial statement amended with new information 
correcting a material inaccuracy in the previous statement.185  There is 
obviously no measurement of never-discovered material misstatements, but 
 
 180.  See Arthur B. Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations: Why Brokers Should Be 
Fiduciaries, 87 WASH. L. REV. 707, 762–63 (2012) (connecting the notion of reasonableness to 
normative rules or principles and distinguishing between expectations supported by good reason and 
those supported by a right grounded in a rule or principle). 
 181.  See generally OVERALL OBJECTIVES OF THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR AND THE CONDUCT OF 
AN AUDIT IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERALLY ACCEPTED AUDITING STANDARDS, Statement on 
Auditing Standards No. 122, § 200 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2012) (presenting the 
standards for the conduct of audits). 
 182.  AUDIT EVIDENCE, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 122, § 500 (Am. Inst. of Certified 
Pub. Accountants 2012). 
 183.  REPORTING ON INTERNAL ACCOUNTING CONTROL, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 30, 
§ 326 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1980). 
 184.  ANALYTICAL PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 122, § 520 (Am. Inst. of 
Certified Pub. Accountants 2012). 
 185.  See SUSAN SCHOLZ, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE CHANGING NATURE AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF PUBLIC COMPANY FINANCIAL RESTATEMENTS: 1997–2006, at 7 (2008), available 
at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/FinancialRestatements_1997_2006. 
pdf, for the precise definition of a financial restatement event for purposes of the figures in this 
discussion.  Changes in financial statements for reasons other than previous misstatements, such as 
adoption of new accounting standards, are not considered restatements.  Id.  Restatements of multiple 
periods resulting from the same restatement event are considered one restatement.  Id. 
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a financial restatement indicates that at least one previous audit failed to 
discover that the financial statements did not fairly represent the financial 
position of the firm.  In 2006, 6005 companies were listed on major 
American securities exchanges,186 and those companies issued 594 
restatements.187  Thus, about 10% of listed companies in 2006 restated their 
financials for a prior period.  This is a ten-fold increase from 1997, when 
only sixty-nine of the 7617 companies then listed (or 0.9%) issued financial 
restatements.188 
However, the large increase in financial restatements from 1997 to 
2006 resulted mostly from issues in accounting for expenses,189 largely 
attributable to the implementation of internal control reporting under 
Sarbanes-Oxley, changes in accounting treatments of leases and stock 
options backdating, and the economic downturn following the end of the 
technology bubble.190  It may also be due, in some degree, to more 
conservative auditing following the accounting scandals related to Enron, 
Global Crossing, and WorldCom.191  For U.S.-listed companies, fraud 
restatements remain rare: twenty-one fraud restatements in 2006 
(representing 0.3% of listed companies) compared to twenty in 1997.192  By 
comparison, in China from 2000 to 2005, there were at least 271 fraud 
restatements, representing 3.7% of all companies listed on the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen exchanges.193 
This low incidence of fraud restatements in the United States may 
seem surprising, given U.S. limits on auditor liability.  However, U.S. 
markets have strong regulatory enforcement and place great value on 
financial reporting quality.  Such elements are absent in the case of U.S.-
 
 186.  Number of Listed Companies, WORLD FED’N EXCHANGES (2006), http://www.world-
exchanges.org/statistics/annual/2006/number-listed-companies.  Major American exchanges are defined 
as the NYSE, NASDAQ, and the American Stock Exchange. 
 187.  Scholz, supra note 185, at 2. 
 188.  Id. at 31; Number of Companies with Shares Listed, WORLD FED’N EXCHANGES (1997), 
http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/annual/1997/number-companies-shares-listed. 
 189.  Scholz, supra note 185, at 31. 
 190.  Id. at 2. 
 191.  The audit firm in each of those scandals, Arthur Andersen, was quickly reduced from an 
85,000-employee global accounting firm to a 150-employee business conference center outside of 
Chicago.  Ameet Sachdev, Conference Center Last Resort for Andersen, CHI. TRIB. (May 22, 2003), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/chi-0305220361may22,0,7603044.story. 
 192.  Scholz, supra note 185, at 31. 
 193.  Michael Firth et al., Cooking the Books: Recipes and Costs of Falsified Financial Statements 
in China, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 371, 375 (2011).  The number of such restatements in each year of the period 
2000–2005 is highly variable.  Id.  Firth et al. examined a sample of 271 restatements resulting from 
deliberate manipulation of financial statements, but the actual number of such restatements is likely 
higher because financial services firms were excluded from the sample.  Id. at 376. 
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affiliated Chinese auditors auditing U.S.-listed companies, a situation in 
which auditors’ professional standards of responsibility to detect fraud may 
be investors’ only protection. 
B. The Expectations Gap 
Investors reasonably expect auditors to detect fraud, but auditors have 
historically disclaimed a responsibility to do so.  Certainly, financial 
statements are the representations of management, not of the auditor.  Yet 
every user of financial statements relies on the auditor’s opinion as some 
degree of assurance against fraud.194  This divergence between expected 
and accepted responsibility to detect fraud creates an expectations gap.  
Historically, the auditing profession has responded to this gap by 
attempting to lower expectations.  But, as discussed below, these 
expectations drive much of the demand for auditors’ services.195 
In the 1910s and 1920s, auditor’s reports certified the balance sheet as 
correct.196  Although not required by law, audits were seen as the primary 
means of detecting fraud in financial statements.197  Then, in 1931, 
Ultramares exposed auditors to liability to third parties relying on the 
auditor’s report for fraudulent misrepresentation if the auditors “acted 
without information leading to a sincere or genuine belief.”198  The 
auditor’s report at issue in Ultramares was a “Certificate of Auditors,” 
issued for 1923, that “certif[ied]” the balance sheet and “further certif[ied]” 
that it presented “a true and correct view of the financial condition” of Fred 
Stern & Company.199  Stern had fraudulently overstated its accounts 
receivable and other assets and had used the auditor’s certification of the 
 
 194.  REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING 49 (1987). 
 195.  For example, after the Enron and Global Crossing bankruptcies, Congress enacted the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act to address concerns about the accuracy of public companies’ financial disclosures.  
H.R. REP. NO. 107-414, at 18 (2002).  The Act does this, in part, by requiring public companies to 
obtain an additional service from auditors: independent attestations of the companies’ internal controls 
over financial reporting.  Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection (Sarbanes-
Oxley) Act of 2002 § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012), amended by Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 § 989G(a) and Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 103 (2012).  
By 2004, total audit fees for S&P 500 companies had increased by 103% from their 2001 levels.  Jack 
T. Ciesielski & Thomas R. Weirich, Ups and Downs of Audit Fees Since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, CPA 
J., Oct. 2006, at 28, 29, available at http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2006/1006/essentials/p28.htm 
(excluding four companies due to lack of available information). 
 196.  PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., ACAP COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION RELATING 
TO THE AUDITOR’S REPORTING MODEL 4 (2010). 
 197.  Stephen A. Zeff, How the U.S. Accounting Profession Got Where It Is Today: Part I, 17 
ACCT. HORIZONS 189, 190–91 (2003). 
 198.  See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 199.  Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 442 (N.Y. 1931). 
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overstated assets to obtain loans.200  In finding auditor liability to the lender 
possible under a theory of fraudulent misrepresentation, Chief Judge 
Cardozo focused heavily on the word “certified.”201  In response to the 
Ultramares case, “certify” disappeared, and “guarantee” changed to 
“opinion” in the auditor’s report language that was made mandatory for 
NYSE-listed companies in 1934.202 
In response to the 1929 market crash, the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 required all registrants to have their financial statements audited by an 
independent CPA.203  During the hearings on the Securities Act of 1933, a 
proposal to assign the external audit function to a government agency had 
been rejected—largely through the efforts of the president of the New York 
State Society of Certified Public Accountants—in favor of requiring audits 
by private CPA firms.204  Thus, instead of creating a new regulatory 
agency, a public regulatory function was delegated as an exclusive 
franchise to accountants certified by a private institution and employed at 
private firms. 
In response to the McKesson & Robbins auditing scandal in 1939, this 
private institution, the American Institute of Accountants (AIA, now the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, or AICPA), began to 
issue bulletins establishing auditing procedures.205  McKesson & Robbins 
perpetrated a financial statement fraud by overstating its accounts 
receivable and inventory.206  The auditor, Price, Waterhouse & Co., failed 
to detect this fraud because its auditing procedures did not test these 
items.207  The AIA, having resisted a government takeover of auditing only 
five years earlier, quickly responded by incorporating the performance of 
these tests into the professional standards for auditors.208 
The AIA adopted a set of standards constituting GAAS in 1948.209  
Standards of Auditing Procedure (SAP) No. 30, adopted in 1951 (restated 
in 1960), disclaimed the responsibility to detect fraud.  It stated that a 
financial statement audit “cannot be relied upon[] to disclose defalcations 
 
 200.  Id. at 443. 
 201.  Id. at 448 (“The defendants certified as a fact, true to their own knowledge, that the balance 
sheet was in accordance with the books of account. If their statement was false, they are not to be 
exonerated because they believed it to be true.” (emphasis added)). 
 202.  PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 196, at 4. 
 203.  Zeff, supra note 197, at 192. 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Id. 
 207.  Id. 
 208.  Id. 
 209.  Id. at 193. 
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and other similar irregularities” and that assurance against fraud should 
instead be sought from “good internal control and fidelity bonds.”210  It also 
stated that an audit “cannot be relied upon to assure” the “discovery of 
deliberate misrepresentation by management” and that the “responsibility 
of the independent auditor for failure to detect fraud . . . arises only when 
such failure clearly results from noncompliance with generally accepted 
auditing standards.”211  This language limits the auditor’s responsibility to 
assuring that the financial statements fairly summarize the financial records 
of the audited company.  It encountered contemporaneous objection.212  
Certainly, “good internal control” is better suited to the detection of frauds 
such as defalcations by employees than the periodic audit of financial 
statements, but audits are expected to discover at least some types or 
magnitudes of fraud.  In Ultramares, Chief Judge Cardozo’s criticism of a 
failure to test receivables213 reflected the clear expectation that an auditor 
should be held responsible for detecting some frauds if the audit itself is not 
to be deemed a fraud.  After the McKesson scandal, testing receivables and 
inventory was made a professional responsibility precisely because auditors 
are expected to discover “deliberate management misrepresentation” of 
those assets. 
Nonetheless, this language was repeated in the AICPA’s superseding 
Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 1 in 1972.214  In the late 1960s, 
decisions by the Southern District of New York in Fischer v. Kletz,215 
Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.,216 and United States v. Simon217 had 
 
 210.  RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR IN THE EXAMINATION OF 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 30, ¶¶ 5–6 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. 
Accountants 1960). 
 211.  Id. ¶ 5. 
 212.  See, e.g., R. K. MAUTZ & HUSSEIN A. SHARAF, THE PHILOSOPHY OF AUDITING 117 (1961) 
(“As a profession, independent auditing must accept appropriate responsibility, and it should do so in a 
positive and courageous fashion.  One can have considerable sympathy with the profession’s wish to 
avoid painful and expensive litigation yet believe that a more straightforward acceptance of 
responsibility is desirable.”). 
 213.  174 N.E. 441, 443–44 (N.Y. 1931) (finding that an auditor examining Stern’s accounts 
receivable “would have found invoices, seventeen in number, which amounted in the aggregate to the 
interpolated item, but scrutiny of these invoices would have disclosed suspicious features in that they 
had no shipping number nor a customer’s order number and varied in terms of credit and in other 
respects from those usual in the business”). 
 214.  CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing 
Standards No. 1, §§ 110.05–.08 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1972). 
 215.  266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (holding that an auditor could be liable for a breach of duty 
to investors for failure to disclose information acquired after audit completion). 
 216.  283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (denying an auditor’s affirmative due diligence defense 
against liability for misleading financial statements in a registration statement). 
 217.  425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969) (affirming the district court’s criminal fraud conviction of three 
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greatly increased auditors’ litigation exposure.218  Simon, especially, was a 
blow to auditors’ efforts to limit their liability for financial statement fraud.  
In Simon, three auditors were held criminally liable for securities fraud and 
mail fraud for certifying a misleading financial statement.219  On review, 
the Second Circuit held that auditors could face criminal liability for 
attesting to materially misleading financial statements if the jury could 
reasonably infer that the auditors had acted in bad faith despite technical 
compliance with GAAS and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP).220  Three years later, the AICPA lost its GAAP rulemaking role 
with the creation of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB).221 
In 1973, only one year after SAS No. 1, Equity Funding Corporation 
of America collapsed222 after the disclosure of accounting fraud so massive 
that the company had dedicated a mainframe computer system exclusively 
to fictitious transactions.223  Nonetheless, the auditors had attested to the 
financial statements, and the fraud had gone undisclosed until an ex-
employee tipped off a securities analyst.224  Three auditors were convicted 
of fraud and sentenced to prison for failure to report evidence of the 
fraud.225 
The AICPA responded to this and other pressures226 in 1977 with SAS 
No. 16, which superseded SAS No. 1, sections 110.05–.08.227  The 
disclaimer of responsibility from 1951 was replaced with ambiguous 
 
auditors who had certified the fraudulent financial statements of Continental Vending Machine Corp.). 
 218.  Zeff, supra note 197, at 197. 
 219.  425 F.2d at 798. 
 220.  Id. at 805.  Certiorari was denied on March 30, 1970.  Simon v. United States, 397 U.S. 1006 
(1970).  President Nixon pardoned the defendants on December 20, 1972.  See Wallace Turner, Rebozo 
Identified as Helping Nixon to Buy Coast Land, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1973, at 1 (reporting concerns 
about the selection of the pardoned defendants’ former firm, Coopers & Lybrand, to confirm the source 
of funding for the President’s purchase of estates in California and Florida, then under investigation by 
the Ervin committee). 
 221.  Zeff, supra note 197, at 198.  FASB was created because of a general sense that auditors were 
representing the interests of their clients, rather than the public, in GAAP standard-setting.  Id. 
 222.  Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 650 (1983). 
 223.  Rick Stelnick, Mainframe: Madoff-Size Money, Monstrous Misapplication, DECODED SCI. 
(Nov. 5, 2011), http://www.decodedscience.com/mainframe-madoff-size-money-monstrous-misapplicat 
ion-loop/4927. 
 224.  Dirks, 463 U.S. at 649. 
 225.  Three Auditors Get Jail in Equity Funding Case, WALL ST. J., Jul. 17, 1975, at 31. 
 226.  Such pressures included other accounting scandals, the Metcalf Committee, enactment of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and a threat of more SEC regulation of auditing.  Roland L. Madison, 
SAS #82: Sword or Shield?, NAT’L PUB. ACCT., Jan./Feb. 1999, at 20. 
 227.  See THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR’S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DETECTION OF ERRORS OR 
IRREGULARITIES, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 16 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 
1977). 
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language stating that the users of financial statements provide themselves 
with reasonable assurance against material misstatements by looking “to 
entities’ controls,” which include legal requirements, corporate governance, 
and internal accounting controls, “together with independent audits.”228  
SAS No. 16 further qualified auditors’ responsibilities by disclaiming 
responsibility to verify the completeness of the entity’s records or to verify 
confirmations made by third parties.229 
Dissatisfaction with auditors’ resistance to accepting responsibility for 
detecting financial statement fraud continued in the 1980s with yet more 
accounting scandals.230  In 1985, Congressman John Dingell publicly 
questioned “whether the S.E.C.’s delegation of its statutory authority [to 
establish standards used in audits] to self-interested private parties has 
adequately fulfilled the commission’s mandate to protect the public 
interest.”231  In 1987, the Treadway Commission recommended that GAAS 
“should be changed to recognize better the independent public accountant’s 
responsibility for detecting fraudulent financial reporting” and that the 
body issuing GAAS should include not only public accountants but also an 
equal number of persons “whose primary concern is with the use of 
auditing products.”232 
The AICPA quickly responded by issuing SAS No. 53 in February 
1988.233  Where SAS No. 1 had said that an audit “cannot be relied upon to 
assure” discovery of “deliberate misrepresentation by management,” SAS 
No. 53 stated that an audit should be able to provide “reasonable 
assurance” against financial statement fraud.234  Risk factors for fraud were 
identified.235  The standard also attempted to lower expectations by 
qualifying “reasonable assurance” to exclude frauds involving forgery or 
collusion with third parties.236 
 
 228.  Id. ¶ 4. 
 229.  Id. ¶¶ 11–13. 
 230.  E.g., Penn Square, United American Bank, Drysdale Government Securities, Continental 
Illinois, and E.S.M. Government Securities.  Michael S. Raab, Detecting and Preventing Financial 
Statement Fraud: The Roles of the Reporting Company and the Independent Auditor, 5 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 514, 517 n.14 (1987). 
 231.  John D. Dingell, Who Audits the Auditors?: Congress Should Be the Watchdog, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 17, 1985, at F2. 
 232.  REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING, supra note 
194, at 13. 
 233.  THE AUDITOR’S RESPONSIBILITY TO DETECT AND REPORT ERRORS AND IRREGULARITIES, 
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 53 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1988). 
 234.  Id. ¶ 5. 
 235.  Id. ¶¶ 10–13. 
 236.  Id. ¶ 7. 
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Nonetheless, dissatisfaction continued.  At the annual conference of 
the New York Society of CPAs in 1992, Assistant Comptroller General 
Donald Chapin “raised the specter of possible action by Congress to 
regulate the profession, and he warned the profession against continuing to 
close the expectation gap by reducing expectations.”237  He went on to say, 
“Expectations [of auditors] are so unbelievably low that some are 
questioning whether there is a role for a private sector profession. . . .  
[T]he profession’s traditional function has been downgraded to a loss 
leader.”238 
Major audit firms, facing saturation of the market for their audit 
services, found rapid growth opportunities in non-audit consulting 
services.239  They accordingly became even more sensitive to litigation risk 
from “loss leader” auditing services.  In the 1990s, they further insulated 
themselves from liability when limited liability partnerships became 
available240 and when the PSLRA both heightened pleading standards for 
Rule 10b-5 actions and limited joint and several liability to defendants who 
knowingly violate securities laws.241  The auditing profession lobbied 
vigorously for the PSLRA’s protections from shareholder actions.242  
Congress overrode President Clinton’s veto to pass the PSLRA, but the 
auditors paid a price for this level of support: they were required to search 
for fraud.243  Title III of the PSLRA requires audits to include procedures to 
provide reasonable assurance of detecting material fraud, to identify 
material related-party transactions, and to evaluate any doubts about the 
audited company as a going concern.244  So, shortly after the enactment of 
the PSLRA, the AICPA replaced SAS No. 53 with a new standard, SAS 
No. 82,245 which slightly strengthened SAS No. 53’s language.  It stated 
than an auditor is able to obtain reasonable assurance against financial 
 
 237.  Stephen A. Zeff, How the U.S. Accounting Profession Got Where It Is Today: Part II, 17 
ACCT. HORIZONS 267, 276 (2003). 
 238.  Id. 
 239.  Id. at 277–79. 
 240.  In 1992, when the AICPA changed Rule 505 of its Code of Professional Conduct to allow 
members to practice under any legal organization, only two states allowed LLPs.  UNIF. P’SHIP ACT 
Addendum to Prefatory Note at 4 (1997).  When LLPs were added to the Uniform Partnership Act in 
1996, “over forty” states allowed them.  Id. 
 241.  § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2012). 
 242.  Zeff, supra note 237, at 278. 
 243.  Abraham J. Briloff, The Private Securities Litigation Reform from a Critical Accountant’s 
Perspective, 10 CRITICAL PERSP. ON ACCT. 267, 275 (1999). 
 244.  § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2012). 
 245.  CONSIDERATION OF FRAUD IN A FINANCIAL STATEMENT AUDIT, Statement on Auditing 
Standards No. 82 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1997). 
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statement fraud246 and went into some detail to define “due professional 
care,” “professional skepticism,” and “reasonable assurance.”247  It also 
repeated the qualifications concerning forgery and collusion.248 
The major accounting scandals in 2001 and 2002 made this a short-
lived standard.  In response to the Enron and Global Crossing scandals, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act created the PCAOB.249  Every auditor of public 
companies must register with the PCAOB and comply with its rules and 
oversight.250  In the same month that the first PCAOB members were 
appointed, SAS No. 99 superseded SAS No. 82.251  It required auditors to 
gather and consider much more information than prior standards, and it 
required auditors to take initiative in identifying, considering, and 
responding to fraud risks.252  The expectations gap persists, however, 
despite these reforms.  Members of the PCAOB are divided between 
auditors (and accounting academics) and financial community users of 
financial statements.253  The PCAOB still struggles with defining auditor 
responsibility, while the financial community remains dissatisfied.254 
A century of accounting scandals forced the auditing profession to 
move from a disclaimer of responsibility to a qualified acceptance of 
responsibility for “reasonable assurance” against fraudulent misstatements, 
but in exchange auditors obtained, in LLPs and the PSLRA, protection 
from liability when they fail to provide such assurance.  As seen in the 
Longtop case, these protections, combined with judicial unwillingness to 
infer scienter, give auditors near-immunity from investor claims arising 
from China-based financial-statement frauds, even when those frauds must 
 
 246.  Id. app. B ¶ 10. 
 247.  Id. app. B. 
 248.  Id. app. B ¶ 12. 
 249.  Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection (Sarbanes-Oxley) Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 101, 116 Stat. 745, 750–53 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7211). 
 250.  Id. 
 251.  CONSIDERATION OF FRAUD IN A FINANCIAL STATEMENT AUDIT, Statement on Auditing 
Standards No. 99 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2002).  This was superseded by SAS No. 
122 on December 15, 2012, as part of the AICPA’s Clarity Project to clarify audit standards and 
converge U.S. GAAS with international standards on auditing.  See STATEMENTS ON AUDITING 
STANDARDS: CLARIFICATION AND RECODIFICATION, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 122 (Am. 
Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2012). 
 252.  CONSIDERATION OF FRAUD IN A FINANCIAL STATEMENT AUDIT, supra note 251, ¶¶ 11–36. 
 253.  See Sarah Johnson, What Is the Auditor’s Role in Finding Fraud?, CFO, Apr. 13, 2010, 
http://ww2.cfo.com/accounting-tax/2010/04/what-is-the-auditors-role-in-finding-fraud/ (noting that in 
response to a Treasury Department advisory group’s recommendation, the PCAOB’s advisory group, 
except for its investor members, “generally refrained from recommending” more detailed audits, citing 
complexity and the possibility of increased liability). 
 254.  See id. (quoting PCAOB member Charles Niemeier) (“Investors are not satisfied with the 
status quo . . . and I think that is justified . . . .”). 
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have been obvious to a diligent auditor.  A century of  accounting scandals 
has not made courts more likely to infer the scienter necessary for auditor 
liability.  Instead, a persistent expectations gap about the usefulness of 
audits for detecting fraud has, ironically, helped to create a judicial 
presumption that auditors who fail to discover even flagrant financial 
statement frauds are not reckless but simply, in the words of the Longtop 
court, “duped.” 
V. CANADIAN REGULATION: A SUCCESS STORY 
Canada does not have a national securities regulator.255  Instead, each 
Canadian province has its own securities regulator.  Because of the primacy 
of the Toronto Stock Exchange in the Canadian capital market, the Ontario 
Securities Commission is the most important Canadian securities 
regulator.256  The common law of negligent misrepresentation, however, is 
controlled by the Supreme Court of Canada.257  The court had once 
recognized that auditors owe investors a duty of care because of auditors’ 
“public watchdog” role,258 but in the late 1990s, echoing then-Chief Judge 
Cardozo’s concern for imposing on auditors “liability in an indeterminate 
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class,”259 the court 
concluded that shareholders can sue negligent auditors only through a 
derivative action.260 
 
 255.  Efforts to establish a federal securities regulator are ongoing.  See Canadian Securities 
Regulation Regime Transition Office Act, S.C. 2009, c. 2, § 297 (establishing an office to lead the 
transition to a national securities regulator). 
 256.  Ronald J. Daniels & Edward J. Waitzer, Challenges to the Citadel: A Brief Overview of 
Recent Trends in Canadian Corporate Governance, 23 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 23, 29–30 (1994). 
 257.  In Canada, auditors can be sued under a theory of either or both negligent misrepresentation 
or negligence simpliciter.  In negligence simpliciter, “the duty of care is based solely upon proximity or 
‘neighbourship’ in the Atkinian sense.”  Wooldridge v. Sumner, [1963] 2 Q.B. 43 at 69 (Diplock L.J.) 
(Eng.).  A negligent misrepresentation action, unlike a negligence simpliciter action, allows recovery of 
pure economic losses.  Negligent Misrepresentation vs. Negligence Simpliciter, LITIG. NOTES (Bersenas 
Jacobsen Chouest Thomson Blackburn LLP, Toronto, Ont., Can.), Jan. 2012, at 1, available at 
http://www.lexcanada.com/data/LitigationNotes_Vol7-1.pdf.  Under a theory of negligent 
misrepresentation, however, plaintiffs must show reasonable reliance on the misrepresentation.  Id.  
Under Canadian law this makes class certification in negligent misrepresentation actions difficult to 
achieve because reliance must be established individually for each class member.  Id.  However, it is 
less difficult when there is a strong claim of fraud against the issuer itself.  See Ward K. Branch & Paul 
Miller, Securities Class Actions and Secondary Liability in Canada: A New Day Dawning?, in 
SECURITIES LAW: ADVANCED ISSUES—2009, § 1.2.7 (Continuing Legal Educ. Soc’y of B.C. ed., 2009), 
available at https://www.cle.bc.ca/PracticePoints/BUS/securities%20class%20actions.pdf.  Major 
China-based securities frauds do present strong fraud claims; therefore, this Note does not address 
reliance issues in achieving class certification. 
 258.  See infra Part V.A. 
 259.  Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931). 
 260.  See infra Part V.A. 
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Dissatisfaction with this evolution of tort law and reaction to U.S. 
reforms such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act motivated Ontario to enact the 
Budget Measures Act,261 an amendment to the Ontario Securities Act 
(OSA)262 and other statutes.  Like Sarbanes-Oxley, the Budget Measures 
Act granted regulators enhanced oversight powers over auditors and 
required issuers to certify their internal controls.263  But more importantly, 
it introduced statutory civil liability for continuous disclosure in the 
secondary market in Ontario.264  And while the U.S. regulatory and liability 
regimes have struggled to protect investors from China-based securities 
frauds, this new liability for continuous disclosure has been rather 
effective.  The contrast between the outcomes of the frauds involving 
Longtop and Sino-Forest is nothing short of breathtaking.  SEC and 
PCAOB efforts to regulate Deloitte in China have been ineffective: 
Longtop investors received nothing, and Longtop’s auditor paid nothing.  
Meanwhile, in Canada, Ernst & Young was compelled to offer $117 
million to settle claims arising from the Sino-Forest fraud.265 
A. The Development of Canadian Tort Law on Auditor Liability 
Auditor liability for negligent misrepresentation is a more recent 
concept in British and Canadian law than in American law, and, as in the 
United States, it is a concept built, in part, on the opinions of Benjamin 
Cardozo.  In 1932, Donoghue v. Stevenson266 removed the requirement of 
privity in English and Scots negligence actions.267  Before that case, 
remedy for injuries arising from defective products that were not inherently 
dangerous had been available through actions for breach of the contract of 
sale.268  The plaintiff, Mrs. Donoghue, had no contractual relationship with 
the seller or manufacturer of the ginger beer containing the infamous 
Paisley snail.269  The House of Lords nonetheless held that she had a cause 
 
 261.  Keeping the Promise for a Strong Economy Act (Budget Measures), S.O. 2002, c. 22. 
 262.  Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5. 
 263.  Id. §§ 143(1)25, 143(1)57–61. 
 264.  Id. pt. XXIII.1. 
 265.  Jeff Gray, Ontario Court Approves $117-Million Settlement with Sino-Forest Auditors, 
GLOBE & MAIL, Mar. 21, 2013, 1:48 PM EDT, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/ 
industry-news/the-law-page/ontario-court-approves-117-million-settlement-with-sino-forest-
auditors/article10044252. 
 266.  [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.). 
 267.  Abed Awad, Comment, The Concept of Defect in American and English Products Liability 
Discourse: Despite Strict Liability Linguistics, Negligence is Back with a Vengeance!, 10 PACE INT’L L. 
REV. 275, 283 (1998). 
 268.  Id. 
 269.  [1932] A.C. at 562. 
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of action against the manufacturer.270  The most expansive opinion in the 
case was that of Lord Atkin: 
 
You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can 
reasonably foresee would be likely to injure . . . . persons who are so 
closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have 
them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind 
to the acts or omissions which are called in question.271 
 
In support of his opinion, Lord Atkin referred to Cardozo’s opinion in 
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,272 which, eighteen years earlier, had 
removed the requirement of privity in New York negligence actions and “in 
which [Cardozo] states the principles of the law as I [Atkin] should desire 
to state them.”273  But Donoghue only concerned physical damage resulting 
from negligence.  The remedy for economic losses from reliance on 
misstatements remained in contract law, which, of course, required privity 
of contract. 
In 1951, Sir Alfred Denning (later Lord Denning) argued for the 
extension of Donoghue to expose auditors to third-party liability for their 
negligent misstatements.  In Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., Henry 
Fraser was persuaded to invest £2000 in a mining concern on the basis of 
certified accounts that “gave an altogether false picture of the position of 
the company” because “there was no verification whatever by the 
accountants of the information which they were given.”274  The case turned 
on whether the auditors owed a duty of care to Fraser.  Lord Denning 
argued in dissent that, under Donoghue, they did.  He reasoned that 
accountants, as “persons who engage in a calling which requires special 
knowledge and skill,” do owe a duty of care because “it is the duty of every 
artificer to exercise his art rightly and truly.”275  They owe this duty to their 
employer and “to any third person to whom . . . they know their employer 
is going to show the accounts, so as to induce him to invest money or take 
some other action.”276  But, citing Ultramares, he argued that this duty does 
not extend to persons to whom the audited company shows the accounts 
 
 270.  Id. 
 271.  Id. at 580. 
 272.  111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
 273.  Donoghue, [1932] A.C. at 598. 
 274.  [1951] 2 K.B. 164 at 168 (Eng.). 
 275.  Id. at 180 (quoting ANTHONY FITZHERBERT, LA NOVELLE NATURA BREVIUM 94D (1534)) 
(internal quotation mark omitted). 
 276.  Id. at 180–81. 
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without the accountants’ knowledge.277  In 1964, in Hedley Byrne & Co. v. 
Heller & Partners Ltd., the House of Lords overruled the Candler majority 
and adopted Lord Denning’s dissent.278 
Canadian law also adopted Lord Denning’s dissent.  Haig v. Bamford 
involved audited financial statements that induced Gordon Haig to invest 
cash and loan guarantees in a company.279  Despite his investment, the 
company began to suffer cash flow problems.280  Subsequent investigation 
showed that a prepayment had been improperly presented in the financial 
statements as revenue and should have been presented as a deferred 
revenue liability.281  In fact, the company had not been not profitable at all: 
it was soon after liquidated by its creditors.282  Haig sued the auditors of the 
financial statements.283  The Supreme Court of Canada held that the auditor 
did owe a duty of care under tort law.284  This duty rested not only on an 
ancient right of the public to expect experts to exercise their expertise 
“rightly and truly” but more importantly on the public role played by 
auditors in the modern economy.  For the majority, Justice Dickson held 
that 
 
The increasing growth and changing role of corporations in modern 
society has been attended by a new perception of the societal role of the 
profession of accounting.  The day when the accountant served only the 
owner-manager of a company and was answerable to him alone has 
passed.  The complexities of modern industry combined with the effects 
of specialization, the impact of taxation, urbanization, the separation of 
ownership from management, the rise of professional corporate 
managers, and a host of other factors, have led to marked changes in the 
role and responsibilities of the accountant, and in the reliance which the 
 
 277.  Id. at 183 (quoting Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1932)) (“[I]t would be 
going too far to make an accountant liable to any person in the land who chooses to rely on the accounts 
in matters of business, for that would expose him to ‘liability in an indeterminate amount for an 
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.’”). 
 278.  [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.) 502–03 (Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest) (appeal taken from Eng.) (“I 
consider that it follows and that it should now be regarded as settled that if someone possessed of a 
special skill undertakes, quite irrespective of contract, to apply that skill for the assistance of another 
person who relies upon such skill, a duty of care will arise. . . .  Furthermore, if in a sphere in which a 
person is so placed that others could reasonably rely upon his judgment or his skill or upon his ability to 
make careful inquiry, a person takes it upon himself to give information or advice to, or allows his 
information or advice to be passed on to, another person who, as he knows or should know, will place 
reliance upon it, then a duty of care will arise.”). 
 279.  (1976), [1977] 1 S.C.R 466, 469. 
 280.  Id. at 470. 
 281.  Id. at 470–71. 
 282.  Id. at 471. 
 283.  Id. 
 284.  Id. at 483–84. 
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public must place upon his work.  The financial statements of the 
corporations upon which he reports can affect the economic interests of 
the general public as well as of shareholders and potential 
shareholders.285 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada thus held—as the U.S. Supreme Court 
would hold eight years later286—that auditors owe a duty of care because of 
their “public watchdog” role: they are licensed to perform what is 
essentially a public regulatory function. 
The court then inquired into the “proximity” of this duty.  The use of 
“proximity” there originated in Lord Denning’s dissent: to avoid the 
unlimited liability that concerned Chief Judge Cardozo in Ultramares, 
there must be something more than reliance to link the injured party to the 
auditor.287  Lord Denning’s proximity test asked whether “the accountants 
[knew] that the accounts were required for submission to the [investor] for 
use by him.”288  The Supreme Court of Canada, recognizing the public role 
of auditors, rejected this narrow proximity test.  Instead, it held that when 
auditors prepare financial statements to guide a “specific class of persons” 
in a “specific class of transactions,” they may be liable when that class of 
persons relies on their statements in engaging in that class of 
transactions.289  The statements at question in Haig were prepared before 
Haig was known to be a possible investor.290  The auditors in Haig knew, 
however, that the statements had been intended for a specific class of 
persons and a specific class of transactions: the “end and aim” of the 
statements had been to secure equity investors.291  Therefore, the auditors 
could be liable to Haig, a member of the class of persons who had relied on 
the financial statements in making an equity investment.292 
 
 285.  Id. at 475–76. 
 286.  See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984). 
 287.  [1977] 1 S.C.R. at 476–77 (citing Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 441 (1932)). 
 288.  Id. at 477 (quoting Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., [1951] 2 K.B. 164 at 181 (Denning 
L.J.) (Eng.)). 
 289.  Id. at 478 (quoting Candler, [1951] 2 K.B. at 184 (Denning L.J.)). 
 290.  Id. at 470. 
 291.  Id. at 478, 482.  The “end and aim” phrase is adopted from yet another Cardozo opinion: 
Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 277 (N.Y. 1922). 
 292.  Id. at 483; see also Queen v. Cognos Inc., [1993] 1 S.C.R. 87, 110 (“[T]he doctrine of Hedley 
Byrne is well established in Canada . . . .  The decisions of this Court . . . suggest five general 
requirements: (1) there must be a duty of care based on a ‘special relationship’ between the representor 
and the representee; (2) the representation in question must be untrue, inaccurate, or misleading; (3) the 
representor must have acted negligently in making said misrepresentation; (4) the representee must have 
relied, in a reasonable manner, on said negligent misrepresentation; and (5) the reliance must have been 
detrimental to the representee in the sense that damages resulted.”). 
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Potential equity investors constitute a very large class of persons: the 
investing world at large.  Liability to the world at large creates the 
possibility of liability out of proportion to fault.  Thus, very shortly after 
Haig, the House of Lords expanded the proximity test: the Anns test asks 
first whether there is sufficient proximity between the plaintiff and 
defendant to create a prima facie duty of care and second whether there are 
policy considerations that negate this prima facie duty of care.293  Although 
the House of Lords overruled Anns in 1991,294 the Supreme Court of 
Canada affirmed it in 1997 in Hercules Managements Ltd. v. Ernst & 
Young.295 
In Hercules, shareholders alleged that they had relied on negligent 
audit reports when investing in a company that subsequently went 
bankrupt.296  The court held that, although rejected by the House of Lords, 
the Anns test had been adopted in Canadian law.297  The Canadian Anns test 
asks, 
 
(1) is there a sufficiently close relationship between the parties (the 
[defendant] and the [plaintiff]) so that, in the reasonable contemplation 
of the [defendant], carelessness on its part might cause damage to that 
person?  If so, 
(2) are there any considerations which ought to negative or limit (a) the 
scope of the duty and (b) the class of persons to whom it is owed or (c) 
the damages to which a breach of it may give rise?298 
 
The court held that the auditors did owe a prima facie duty of care to the 
plaintiffs because their reliance on the audit reports was both reasonable 
and foreseeable.299 
 
 293.  Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, [1978] A.C. 728 (H.L.) 751–52 (appeal taken from 
Eng.). 
 294.  Murphy v. Brentwood Dist. Council, [1991] 1 A.C. 398 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).  
Arguably, Anns had earlier been rejected in the auditing context by Caparo Industries Plc. v. Dickman, 
[1990] 2 A.C. 605 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).  See Jack Blackier & Mindy Paskell-Mede, Auditor 
Liability in Canada: The Past, Present, and Future, 48 U.N.B.L.J. 65, 71–73 (1999) (discussing the 
relation between Anns and Caparo Industries). 
 295.  [1997] 2 S.C.R. 165.  For a discussion of the divergence between the House of Lords and the 
Supreme Court of Canada, see Blackier & Paskell-Mede, supra note 280. 
 296.  Hercules, [1997] 2 S.C.R. at 175. 
 297.  See id. at 184 (“It is now well established in Canadian law that the existence of a duty of care 
in tort is to be determined through an application of the two-part test first enunciated by Lord 
Wilberforce in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council.”). 
 298.  City of Kamloops v. Nielsen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2, 10–11. 
 299.  Hercules, [1997] 2 S.C.R. at 200 (“[T]here can be no question that a prima facie duty of care 
was owed to the appellants by the respondents on the facts of this case.”). 
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The second prong of the Anns test seeks to avoid liability out of 
proportion to fault by limiting the scope of the duty identified in the first 
prong.300  The author of the unanimous majority opinion in Hercules, 
Justice La Forest, worried that exposing auditors to a broad duty of care 
would increase insurance costs, increase the time required to produce 
financial reports, and, ultimately, reduce the availability of auditing 
services.301  So he limited the scope of liability by limiting the purpose for 
which audit statements should be used: “the only purpose for which the 
[audit] reports could have been used in such a manner as to give rise to a 
duty of care on the part of the [auditor] is as a guide for the shareholders, as 
a group, in supervising or overseeing management.”302  He distinguished 
Hercules from Haig by noting that in Haig the audit report in question had 
been prepared for the specific purpose of securing investors, whereas the 
reports in Hercules had been general annual reports.303  Applying the rule 
of Foss v. Harbottle,304 the court concluded that shareholders can sue 
negligent auditors only through a derivative action.305 
B. The Ontario Securities Act: Part XXIII.1 
In the 1990s, auditors in the United States obtained major protections 
from liability to investors with the introduction of the LLP and the 
enactment of the PSLRA.306  Similarly, in the 1990s, auditors in Canada 
raised the specter of unlimited liability to avoid liability to investors who 
rely on their work.  The Hercules court’s conclusion that shareholders 
should not rely on audited financial statements drew a sharp reaction.307 
 
 300.  See id. at 202 (“[W]ere auditors such as the respondents held to owe a duty of care to 
plaintiffs in all cases where the first branch of the Anns/Kamloops test was satisfied, the problem of 
indeterminate liability would normally arise.”). 
 301.  Grace Hession, Auditor Independence and Liability in Canada: Are We Ready for Third Party 
Liability?, 36 U.B.C. L. REV. 575, 606 (2003). 
 302.  Hercules, [1997] 2 S.C.R. at 207–08. 
 303.  Id. at 191. 
 304.  (1843) 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (holding that for wrongs alleged to 
have been done to a corporation, the proper claimant is the corporation itself). 
 305.  Hercules, [1997] 2 S.C.R. at 211–14.  Additionally, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice held 
that Hercules Management had foreclosed any “fraud on the market” theory for secondary market 
claims and that reliance must be established in all cases alleging negligent misrepresentation.  Carom v. 
Bre-X Minerals Ltd. (1998), 41 O.R. 3d 780 (Can. Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.). 
 306.  See supra Part III. 
 307.  See, e.g., Philip Mathias, Auditors Not Legally Liable to Investors, Top Court Rules, FIN. 
POST (Toronto), May 24, 1997, § 1, at 3 (quoting York University Professor Al Rosen) (“The annual 
financial statement is now a joke. . . .  Who really needs an audit of financial statements that are not 
useful for investor decision-making?”); Need New Securities Law That Holds Auditors Liable, Editorial, 
FIN. POST., May 27, 1997, § 1, at 18 (“Provincial governments should quickly establish new securities 
law that makes a negligent auditor liable when investors lose money after relying on a company’s 
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Soon thereafter, and in response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the 
United States, Ontario introduced an amendment to the OSA, which, 
among other things, created civil liability for secondary market disclosures, 
codified at Part XXIII.1 of the OSA.308  Previously, the OSA had imposed 
statutory liability only for misrepresentation in a prospectus, offering 
memorandum, or circular.309  Part XXIII.1 allows investors to sue the issuer 
of a security and other responsible parties—specifically including 
auditors—if they acquire or dispose of the issuer’s securities during a 
period when there is an uncorrected misrepresentation in a statement or 
document released by the issuer or during a period in which the issuer fails 
to make a timely disclosure of a material change.310  Investors do not have 
to demonstrate actual reliance on such misrepresentations to seek 
damages.311 
Part XXIII.1 provides a statutory scheme for calculating investor 
damages, including a provision for compensation for unrealized losses.312  
But damages are limited.  There is a proportionate liability scheme: where 
there are multiple defendants, such as an auditor and the audited company, 
each defendant is liable only for the portion of the damages corresponding 
to that defendant’s relative responsibility for those damages, except that 
defendants who meet an elevated scienter requirement in misrepresentation 
have joint and several liability with all other defendants who meet that 
scienter requirement.313  There are also statutory caps on damages, except 
for defendants who meet the elevated scienter requirement.314  An auditor’s 
liability is limited to the greater of C$1 million or the revenue earned from 
the issuer and its affiliates in the twelve months preceding the 
misrepresentation.315  Damages paid by defendants in related actions in 
other Canadian jurisdictions are creditable against the Ontario liability 
cap.316 
 
audited financial statements.”). 
 308.  Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, pt. XXIII.1.  The Act was initially introduced in the 
Ontario Legislative Assembly as Bill 198 on October 30, 2002, and after a convoluted legislative 
process, Part XXIII.1 was proclaimed into force on December 30, 2005.  Michael J. Willis, Market 
Reaction to the Introduction of Shareholder Class Action Litigation: Evidence from Canada 8–10 (Dec. 
20, 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania) (on file with Duke Journal of 
Comparative & International Law). 
 309.  Id. pt. XXIII. 
 310.  Id. pt. XXIII.1, § 138.3. 
 311.  Id. § 138.1. 
 312.  Id. § 138.5. 
 313.  Id. § 138.6. 
 314.  Id. § 138.7. 
 315.  Id. 
 316.  Id. 
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Thus, a plaintiff suing an auditor under Part XXIII.1 has two options.  
If the plaintiff does not allege scienter, then he or she only need show that 
the financial statements contained a misrepresentation.  But in such cases, 
the auditor’s liability is proportionate to the auditor’s level of fault and in 
any event capped at the greater of C$1 million or one year’s audit fees.  Or, 
if the plaintiff can show that the auditor acted with scienter, there is no 
limit to liability.  To show scienter, the plaintiff must prove that the auditor 
“authorized, permitted or acquiesced” in or influenced the making of the 
misrepresentation while “knowing” that it was a misrepresentation.317 
Part XXIII.1 provides several statutory defenses.  The defenses most 
relevant to auditors of financial statements are: (1) an exemption from 
liability for forward-looking information, such as pro forma financial 
statements, if that information includes certain cautionary language and (2) 
a reasonable investigation, or due diligence, defense.318  The due diligence 
defense bars liability where an auditor can prove that it conducted a 
reasonable investigation and that it had no reasonable grounds to believe 
that there was a misrepresentation.319  This is an affirmative defense: 
auditors are presumptively liable for misrepresentations and bear the 
burden of proving the due diligence of their audits.320 
Finally, Part XXIII.1 suits cannot commence without leave of the 
court.321  The court must be satisfied that the action is brought in good faith 
and that there is a reasonable possibility of success.322  This provision is an 
attempt to prevent frivolous suits.  Additionally, Part XXIII.1 avoids “strike 
suits” by providing that the prevailing party is entitled to costs.323  Unlike 
in the United States, where the PSLRA attempts to prevent frivolous suits 
by raising the pleading standard required to state a claim at all,324 Part 
XXIII.1 attempts to prevent frivolous suits by assessing the merits of the 
claim at the earliest stage and by granting costs to the prevailing party. 
From 2006 to 2011, thirty-four Part XXIII.1 actions were filed.325  By 
December 2012, nine of those cases had settled and twenty-five were 
pending.326  Every settled case settled for an amount exceeding C$1 
 
 317.  Id. 
 318.  Id. § 138.4. 
 319.  Id. 
 320.  Id. 
 321.  Id. § 138.8. 
 322.  Id. 
 323.  Id. § 138.11. 
 324.  See supra Part III.A. 
 325.  Willis, supra note 308, at 4. 
 326.  Id. at 28. 
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million: the total of all settlements against all defendants—not just 
auditors—was C$68.35 million, and the average settlement was 
approximately C$8.5 million.327  Then, in 2013, Ernst & Young settled the 
Sino-Forest case for C$117 million.328 
C. The Sino-Forest Fraud 
Sino-Forest Corporation (Sino-Forest) was a Chinese forestry 
company registered in Ontario and headquartered in Hong Kong.329  It went 
public in Alberta through a reserve takeover in 1994, and in 1995 it listed 
on the Toronto Stock Exchange.330  On June 2, 2011, its share price 
plummeted when Carson Block of Muddy Waters, LLC, alleged that Sino-
Forest had fraudulently inflated its assets and earnings.331  Muddy Waters, 
like Citron Research, which exposed the Longtop fraud, is a short-selling 
firm that researches public company financial disclosures, identifies 
companies with questionable financial reporting, takes a short position in 
them, and then discloses its research to the market.332  It specializes in 
Chinese frauds.333 
Muddy Waters reported that Sino-Forest was “the granddaddy of 
China RTO [reverse takeover] frauds.”334  It “was engaged in aggressive 
fraud from the time it went public.”335  It used undisclosed “authorized 
intermediaries,” which were actually related entities, to fabricate sales and 
to exaggerate assets.336  One of these intermediaries had as its registered 
address an empty field in a fishing village.337  Most of Sino-Forest’s 
revenues came from these intermediaries, allowing Sino-Forest to claim a 
 
 327.  Id. 
 328.  Peter Koven, Judge Approves Ernst & Young Settlement for Sino-Forest Shareholders, FIN. 
POST (Toronto), Mar. 20, 2013, http://business.financialpost.com/2013/03/20/judge-approves-ernst-
young-settlement-for-sino-forest-shareholders/. 
 329.  Andy Hoffman & Mark Mackinnon, The Roots of the Sino-Forest Mystery, GLOBE & MAIL 
(Toronto), Sept. 13, 2011, 5:45 PM, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/the-roots-of-the-
sino-forest-mystery/article594111/?page=all. 
 330.  Id. 
 331.  Statement of Allegations, ¶ 10, In re Ernst & Young LLP, Ontario Securities Commission 
(Dec. 3, 2012), available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Proceedings-SOA/soa_20121203_ 
ernst-young.pdf. 
 332.  Hibah Yousuf, How Muddy Waters Spots Fraud in China, CNN MONEY (May 2, 2012, 9:39 
AM ET), http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/02/markets/muddy-waters-carson-block/. 
 333.  Id. 
 334.  MUDDY WATERS, LLC, REPORT ON SINO-FOREST CORPORATION 1 (2011), available at http:// 
d.muddywatersresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/MW_TRE_060211.pdf. 
 335.  Id. at 4. 
 336.  Id. at 1. 
 337.  Id. at 1, 27. 
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gross margin of fifty-five percent.338  Its financial claims, like those of 
Longtop, were audacious in their obvious implausibility.  For example, its 
claimed Yunnan province sales would have exceeded harvesting quotas 
sixfold and would have required over 50,000 log-transporting trucks.339  
Sino-Forest used an opaque offshore structure—at least twenty entities 
incorporated in the British Virgin Islands—to conceal its fraud.340  Sino-
Forest was audited by Ernst & Young’s Canadian entity, Ernst & Young 
LLP.341  Concerning the quality of Ernst & Young’s audits, Muddy Waters 
Research said that Sino-Forest’s “board of directors appears to be the 
retirement plan for former Ernst & Young partners.”342 
Muddy Waters estimated that Sino-Forest’s shares were worth less 
than $1 per share.343  On May 27, 2011, Sino-Forest’s shares closed at 
$18.39 per share.344  The day after Muddy Waters Research released its 
report, they closed at $5.23 per share.345  On August 26, 2011, the Ontario 
Securities Commission suspended trading in Sino-Forest shares because the 
company had engaged in fraud: its shares then became worthless.346  On 
January 10, 2012, Sino-Forest announced that its financial statements and 
audit reports should not be relied on.347  On March 30, 2012, Sino-Forest 
filed for bankruptcy.348 
On June 20, 2011—only eighteen days after Muddy Waters released 
its report—a pension fund holding Sino-Forest shares filed suit against 
Sino-Forest, Ernst & Young, and many other defendants.349  The fund 
alleged, regarding Ernst & Young, negligent misrepresentation and 
statutory claims under Part XXIII.1, among other things.350  On December 
 
 338.  Id. at 1. 
 339.  Id. at 2. 
 340.  Id. at 33. 
 341.  Id. at 2. 
 342.  Id. 
 343.  Id. at 3. 
 344.  GOOGLE FINANCE, http://www.google.com/finance (get quotes search) (last visited Nov. 9, 
2013). 
 345.  Id. 
 346.  Christopher Donville, Sino-Forest Trading Halted as OSC Rescinds Order That Executives 
Resign, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 26, 2011, 4:52 PM ET), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-
26/sino-forest-executives-ordered-to-resign.html. 
 347.  Statement of Allegations, supra note 331, ¶ 14. 
 348.  Sino-Forest Files for Bankruptcy Protection, BBC NEWS (Mar. 30, 2012, 17:58 ET), http:// 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17569840. 
 349.  Notice of Action, Trs. of the Labourers’ Pension Fund of Cent. & E. Can. v. Sino-Forest 
Corp., 2012 ONSC 2937 (Can. Ont.) (No. CV-11-429003-00CP). 
 350.  Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim, Trs. of the Labourers’ Pension Fund of Cent. and E. 
Can., 2012 ONSC 2937 (No. CV-11-431153-00CP). 
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3, 2012, the Ontario Securities Commission filed charges against Ernst & 
Young, alleging that its audits constituted a breach of section 78 of the 
OSA.351  That same day, Ernst & Young settled the Part XXIII.1 suit for 
C$117 million.352  The settlement was approved on March 20, 2013.353 
The contrast with the Longtop litigation is shocking.  In the United 
States, a shareholder suit under Rule 10b-5 arising from an audacious 
China-based securities fraud could not survive a motion to dismiss.  The 
investors received nothing, and the auditors paid nothing.  In Canada, a 
shareholder suit arising under Part XXIII.1 from an audacious China-based 
securities fraud proceeded and, eighteen months later, settled for a record-
breaking amount.  Three points of comparison are particularly notable: 
1) Vicarious liability was not an issue in the Sino-Forest case because 
the auditor was Ernst & Young’s Canadian affiliate. 
2) The Ontario Securities Commission’s charges, filed against Ernst & 
Young on December 3, 2012, probably influenced Ernst & Young’s 
decision to offer a settlement that same day.  On the same December 3, 
2012, the SEC filed administrative proceedings against Deloitte for failing 
to provide the SEC with audit working papers related to Chinese 
companies—including Longtop, certainly—trading on U.S. markets.  But 
that had no impact on the Longtop litigation: the amended complaint was 
dismissed on April 8, 2013.  The court stood by its amazing conclusion that 
Deloitte had “performed a diligent audit, only to be duped by Longtop’s 
fraud.”354 
3) The Canadian plaintiff in the Sino-Forest fraud did not need to 
show scienter to state a claim—scienter, if shown, would have simply 
removed the statutory limit on damages.  To proceed, the plaintiff needed 
only to persuade the court that the claim was meritorious.  But the U.S. 
plaintiffs in the Longtop fraud were required to allege scienter by pleading 
with particularity facts giving rise to a “strong inference” of scienter.355  As 
discussed in Part III.A, it is nearly impossible for a U.S. plaintiff alleging 
China-based fraud to do this.  Even the SEC could not obtain Deloitte’s 
work papers from China until well after the dismissal of the Longtop 
plaintiffs’ claims against Deloitte. 
 
 351.  Statement of Allegations, supra note 331, ¶ 65. 
 352.  Kevin LaCroix, E&Y Settles Ontario Sino-Forest Securities Suit for $117 Million, D&O 
DIARY (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.dandodiary.com/2012/12/articles/securities-litigation/ey-settles-
ontario-sino-forest-securities-suit-for-117-million/. 
 353.  Gray, supra note 265. 
 354.  In re Longtop Fin. Techs. Ltd. Sec. Litig., 910 F. Supp. 2d. 561, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 355.  15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(4) (2012). 
BARBER MACRO(DO NOT DELETE) 6/26/2014  9:51 PM 
2013] BULL IN THE CHINA MARKET 397 
VI. LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
U.S. and Canadian auditor liability regimes had certain similarities, 
pre-Enron.  Both had developed, by the late 1990s, to a point at which it 
was virtually impossible to show auditor fraud.  In the United States, 
auditors received protections from liability to investors under the PSLRA.  
In Canada, tort law developed in a way that limited investors to derivative 
suits against corporate auditors—problematic when the corporation itself is 
a fraud. 
After Enron, however, U.S. and Canadian regulation took markedly 
different approaches.  Under Sarbanes-Oxley, the United States focused on 
increasing regulatory oversight of auditors.  Ontario also increased 
regulatory oversight of auditors but additionally created a statutory civil 
liability regime.  When confronted with China-based securities frauds, the 
U.S. model has not protected investors well.  It bears noting, again, that 
Sino-Forest’s auditor was the Canadian affiliate of Ernst & Young, but 
Longtop’s auditor was the Chinese affiliate of Deloitte.  Nonetheless, it is 
impossible to compare the results of litigation against Longtop and Sino-
Forest and conclude that investors in U.S. capital markets are as well 
protected from China-based frauds as are investors in Canadian markets.  
An auditor providing an audit opinion for a Chinese company listed in 
Toronto surely feels more performance pressure from potential legal 
liabilities than an auditor providing an opinion for a Chinese company 
listed in New York. 
The U.S. experience with frauds by U.S.-listed Chinese firms, when 
considered alone and when considered in comparison with recent Canadian 
experience, suggests at least four possible reforms to better protect U.S. 
investors.  First, the PSLRA and Tellabs go too far in requiring scienter to 
be effectively proven before discovery.  Tellabs requires courts to dismiss 
complaints against auditors of U.S.-listed Chinese firms unless the 
allegations give rise to such a strong inference of scienter that no 
reasonable person could imagine any compelling inference to the contrary.  
But at that stage the auditor always can (and will) say, “It’s China—we 
were duped too.”  Under Tellabs, the court must decide whether this is a 
compelling inference before discovery—i.e., before the auditor must 
produce the work papers and other documents that establish whether the 
auditor was in fact “duped.”  It is difficult to see how, at the Rule 12(b)(6) 
stage, courts can make informed decisions that the inference of auditor 
scienter is more or less compelling than the inference that the issuer’s fraud 
overcame the auditor’s diligence when the underlying events—the 
transactions being audited and the audit itself—take place in China. 
Courts need to screen claims for merit prior to commencement of 
BARBER MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 6/26/2014  9:51 PM 
398 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 24:349 
expensive trials of those claims.  This is recognized both in the heightened 
pleading requirements of the PSLRA and in Part XXIII.1’s leave-of-the-
court requirement.  The heightened pleading standards of the PSLRA, 
however, are particularly difficult in cases alleging reckless audits in 
China.  The standard effectively forces courts to search for an apology for 
the auditor.  Cases alleging fraud on the other side of the world may present 
the imagination with too much scope.  A judge in Manhattan inferring what 
happened in China from advocacy by New York lawyers is not anchored in 
the contextual reality of the case in anything like the degree to which he or 
she is when inferring what happens on Wall Street.  In the context of 
Chinese audits, the pleading standard amplifies the impact of skilled 
advocacy and reduces the impact of the facts of the case. 
For example, in the Longtop case, the Southern District of New York 
concluded, “DTTC performed a diligent audit, only to be duped by 
Longtop’s fraud.”356  This was supported, in significant part, by the finding 
that Longtop’s arrangement with XLHRS “would not lead a reasonable 
auditor to suspect wrongdoing, given that this sort of staffing arrangement 
is common.”357  “Given that this sort of staffing arrangement is common” is 
obviously a finding of fact on a material fact in dispute, despite the Rule 
12(b)(6) posture of the case.  And it is an erroneous finding of fact.358  But 
how would the court know?  The adversarial system assumes that the court 
will be informed by counsel representing the litigants,359 but this is unlikely 
to be effective before the litigation begins in earnest.  The PSLRA pleading 
standard invites factual findings without a record because courts must 
gauge the plausibility of competing explanations for alleged facts to make a 
determination as to whether those alleged facts give rise to a “strong 
inference” of scienter before the parties may develop the factual record.  In 
effect, auditor due diligence becomes a pleadings issue: instead of being an 
affirmative defense for which the auditor bears the burden of proof, as 
under Ontario’s Part XXIII.1, it is a hypothetical excuse that an auditor 
may proffer before anything is proven. 
Courts screening complaints against auditors to decide which ones 
should be litigated at least to the point of an answer need to be informed by 
some background subject matter expertise.  It therefore might be wise for 
courts to use a special master possessing such expertise.  Originally, special 
 
 356.  In re Longtop Fin. Techs. Sec. Litig., 910 F. Supp. 2d. at 581. 
 357.  Id. at 577. 
 358.  See supra Part II.B. 
 359.  E.g., Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988) (“This [adversarial] system is premised on the 
well tested principle that truth—as well as fairness—is ‘best discovered by powerful statements on both 
sides of the question.’” (citation omitted)). 
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masters appointed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure heard trial 
testimony and reported recommended findings of fact “when the issues 
[were] complicated.”360  Since 2003, special masters can be used under 
Rule 53 to assist any pre-trial or post-trial role if the parties consent.361  
Special masters have been used to hear Rule 12(b)(6) motions in federal 
and state courts.362  Removing the necessity of the parties’ consent for the 
use of a special master could allow a court to appoint a master to report 
recommendations to the court concerning the “plausibility” of a complaint 
alleging auditor negligence. 
Second, making scienter an element of the substantive standard for 
auditor liability imposes too high of a burden on plaintiffs.  Clearly, 
auditors must be protected from “liability in an indeterminate amount for 
an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.”363  In the United States, 
this has come to mean that liability can only be had against an auditor 
under Rule 10b-5 if the auditor acted with scienter.  Ontario’s Part XXIII.1 
sensibly accomplishes this protection through its cap on damages absent 
proof of scienter.  The comparison of the Longtop scandal in the United 
States with the Sino-Forest scandal in Canada suggests that the Canadian 
policy better serves the public policy goal of protecting investors. 
Even in U.S. securities laws, scienter is not always a requirement for 
liability.  For example, Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933364 does not 
require scienter and in some situations is an available action against 
auditors involved in financial statement frauds.365  But Section 11 primarily 
protects investors in the primary market by imposing liability for 
misstatements in registration statements.366  Although it is available to 
purchasers on secondary markets, 1) it requires purchasers to trace the 
purchase back to the initial offering, 2) it requires purchasers to show 
reliance on the registration statement where they bought securities more 
than one year after the registration statement and the issuer had already 
distributed financial statements, and 3) its statute of limitations requires 
actions to be brought no later than three years after the security at issue was 
 
 360.  Shira A. Scheindlin & Jonathan M. Redgrave, Special Masters and E-Discovery: The 
Intersection of Two Recent Revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 
347, 348 (2008) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 53(b) (1938) (amended 2003)). 
 361.  Id. at 352. 
 362.  See, e.g., Askew v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-767V, 2012 WL 2061804 (Fed. 
Cl. May 17, 2012); Stop & Shop Cos. v. Fisher, 444 N.E.2d 368 (Mass. 1983). 
 363.  Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931). 
 364.  15 U.S.C § 77k (2012). 
 365.  DONNA M. NAGY ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 271 (3d ed. 2012). 
 366.  Id. at 271–72. 
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first offered to the public.367  Longtop held its IPO on October 24, 2007, 
and a secondary offering on November 17, 2009.368  The fraud was exposed 
on April 26, 2011.369  Thus, the statute of limitations had run with respect 
to the 8.5 million shares issued through Longtop’s IPO but not the 4.25 
million shares issued through the secondary offering.  To have standing to 
sue under Section 11, the Longtop plaintiffs would have had to trace their 
shares to the secondary offering registration statement and to prove that 
their purchase decisions had relied on that statement and not on Longtop’s 
subsequent fraudulent financial statements. 
Hence, the purchasers of Longtop securities, like any secondary 
market purchaser duped by a financial statement fraud undetected for a few 
years, needed to prove scienter to have recourse against the auditor on 
whom they had relied for protection against financial statement frauds.  
Instead, Deloitte’s repeated attestations to the veracity of Longtop’s 
financials only served to prolong the fraud to the point that scienter had to 
be proven.  As noted above, when the audit takes place in China, it is 
perhaps impossible even to plead scienter adequately.  But pleading 
standards aside, it is not clear what public interest is served by making 
scienter a substantive requirement for auditor liability to secondary market 
purchasers.  Why should auditors receive greater protection from liability 
regarding long-standing financial statement frauds over successive Form 
10-Qs than from liability regarding similar but nascent frauds on a Form S-
1? 
Third, a domestic accounting network affiliate should bear vicarious 
liability for foreign affiliates’ audits of companies listed on domestic 
exchanges.  Investors look to U.S. audit firms for assurance regarding 
financial statements for companies listed on U.S. exchanges.  Auditors 
should not be allowed to defeat this reasonable expectation through 
organization as an international network of affiliates trading under the same 
name as the U.S. firm.  After all, “[t]he prospect of liability . . . constitutes 
‘one of the major stimuli to objective and unbiased consideration of the 
problems encountered in a particular [audit] engagement.”370  It would be 
in the public interest if this prospect of liability were to prevent trusted 
auditors from extending their brand into new markets in which they are 
 
 367. Id. at 272–73. 334–35. 
 368.  Consolidated Class Action Complaint, supra note 61, ¶¶ 39–40. 
 369.  Id. ¶ 44. 
 370.  Deborah A. DeMott, Further Perspectives on Corporate Wrongdoing, In Pari Delicto, and 
Auditor Malpractice, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 339, 350 n.52 (2012) (quoting Codification of Financial 
Reporting Policies § 602.02.f.i, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 73,274 (2009)) (describing the SEC’s view 
on auditor liability). 
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more certain of their ability to collect audit fees than of their ability to 
attest to financial statements.  Perhaps the easiest way to accomplish this 
would be to require the U.S. affiliate of a global audit firm to “sign” any 
audit opinions or similar statements used in SEC filings, analogously to the 
practice of using a locally-admitted lawyer to file briefs drafted by out-of-
state lawyers.  After all, it does seem incongruous to rely on audit firms 
beyond the reach of the SEC, such as DTTC, to ensure the accuracy of SEC 
filings. 
Fourth, the scope of auditor liability could be made inversely 
contingent on the effectiveness of cross-border SEC regulation.  The 
current standoff between the SEC and Chinese regulators shows that cross-
border regulation by the SEC is not always an available substitute for 
auditor liability.  In markets such as China, where local authorities resist 
SEC supervision and investigation of auditors,371 U.S. investors are less 
protected, and the public policy need to expose auditors to liability to 
investors is correspondingly greater.  Therefore, it may be beneficial to 
increase the scope of auditor liability—ideally, the scope of liability for the 
auditor’s U.S. affiliate—in those markets. 
For example, in markets where the SEC cannot effectively investigate 
auditors, scienter will be almost impossible to show.  If the SEC cannot 
obtain auditor work papers, or if the SEC can obtain those work papers 
only after months or years of tense, high-level negotiations, then there is no 
reason to suppose that a private litigant could timely obtain those work 
papers.  Exposing auditors to greater liability in the U.S. market for audits 
occurring in markets beyond the SEC’s reach—for example, by removing 
any statutory cap on liability, if one existed—would have several 
potentially salutary effects.  It would cause U.S. audit firms to supervise the 
operations of affected local affiliates much more closely.  It would also 
give U.S. audit firms great hesitation in extending their brand to markets in 
which they cannot provide assurance services meeting U.S. market 
expectations.  Finally, and most importantly, it would incentivize them to 
pressure local authorities to come to an agreement with the SEC. 
CONCLUSION 
Auditors are private parties granted an exclusive right to perform a 
public regulatory function.  The Supreme Court held unanimously that “the 
independent auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending any 
employment relationship with the client.”372  Auditors’ professional 
 
 371.  See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 372.  United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817 (1984). 
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standards, however, do not protect the investing public’s reasonable 
expectations with regard to Chinese entities listed on U.S. exchanges.  
Those standards have developed from the self-interested responses of the 
auditing profession to public criticisms of its failures to perform its public 
function adequately.  Nor does the law concerning auditor liability protect 
the investing public’s reasonable expectations.  Instead, it provides the 
auditing profession near-immunity from investor complaints.373  Protecting 
the public’s reasonable expectations requires exposing auditors to at least 
the possibility of liability when their public audits fail to meet those 
expectations.  The value of “tinkering with liability standards” is not to 
compensate investors for their losses—securities class action suits 
generally fail to compensate investors—but to provide “a sober reminder 
that financial frauds will be aggressively pursued by well-armed and 
resourceful private attorney[s] general[].”374 
 
 373.  See Alison Frankel, The Near-Impossible Standard for Showing Auditor Fraud REUTERS, 
Apr. 9, 2013, available at http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2013/04/09/the-near-impossible-
standard-for-showing-auditor-fraud/ (citing the Longtop decision as evidence of the near-impossibility 
of an investor class successfully stating a fraud claim against an auditor). 
 374.  JAMES D. COX, STATEMENT SUBMITTED TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE AUDITING 
PROFESSION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY 4 (2007). 
